



OUTCOMES OF THE COP26 MEETING

November 19, 2021

BACKGROUND

1. The COP26 was convened in Glasgow, Scotland from October 31 to November 13, 2021¹ under the Presidency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), in partnership with Italy.
2. The COP serves as the main forum for negotiations among the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC to discuss and negotiate efforts towards addressing the climate crisis.
3. Towards the opening of COP26, Parties, observers, and experts identified a number of major issues to be discussed, namely:
 - Fair shares and level of ambition in mitigation targets (i.e. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets) among Parties, in line with the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C;
 - Delivery of the pledge among developed countries (i.e. Annex II) to mobilize USD 100 Billion annually by 2020, to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries, particularly those most vulnerable to climate change²;
 - Addressing Loss and Damage among Parties that have incurred irreversible impacts from disasters arising from climate change; and
 - Setting the rules on Carbon Markets (i.e. trading and offsetting of GHG emissions), which have been overdue for the past three years³.

THE PHILIPPINE DELEGATION

4. The undersigned was appointed by the President as Head of Delegation, Chief Negotiator, and Official Representative of the President to the COP26. Joining the undersigned were representatives from the Department of Finance (8), the

¹The COP26 was originally scheduled to be convened in 2020 but had to be postponed due to the difficulties posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Coordination meetings/pre-negotiations among country groups were held on October 29-30, 2021 (with the Philippines attending the G-77 and China country group). Discussions/negotiations were extended for an additional day (the closure of the COP26 originally scheduled on November 12), after some deadlocks among parties on various issues (i.e. fossil fuel subsidies, upgrading of mitigation targets, and climate finance).

²The pledge arises from the recognition that developed countries have contributed the most to global warming due to heavy emissions since the Industrial Revolution.

³ Negotiations on this issue broke down at COP25 in 2019 held in Madrid, Spain.

Department of Foreign Affairs (6), the Department of Energy (2), and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (1)⁴.

5. Following discussions among the members of the Philippine Delegation as well as consultations with various relevant agencies, it was determined prior to the Delegation's departure that the Delegation would concentrate on the following issues (with assigned work streams) under COP26:

- Climate Finance
- Adaptation, Loss, and Damage
- Article 6 for the Paris Agreement⁵

In addition, the Delegation prioritized participating in the coordination meetings and consultations with the G77⁶ and China Group, which is the only country group in the COP26 where the Philippines is a member.

POSITIONS AND MAJOR MESSAGES CONVEYED

6. **National Statement.** The undersigned raised the following points in the Philippines' National Statement⁷, which lays out the country's main positions and interests in the COP26 discussions:

- The Philippines, while only accounting for 0.3 percent of global GHG emissions, bears the brunt of the consequences of climate change.
- The Philippines, determined to be a world leader in climate action, has set the boldest climate ambition through its recently submitted Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) at 75 percent reduction of GHG emissions by 2030.
- To move ahead with urgency to fulfill its ambitious target, the Philippines has shifted from theorizing about climate change to executing practical climate change mitigation and adaptation projects on the ground, such as:
 - Putting together a group of Filipino experts from all corners of the Philippines to engage Filipinos in climate vulnerable communities and prepare them to execute localized action plans;
 - Launching of the Philippines' Sustainable Finance Roadmap to encourage public and private investment in green projects;

⁴ Please see Annex 1 for the complete list of the Philippine Delegation.

⁵ The Paris Agreement is an international treaty on climate change adopted in 2015. It covers climate change mitigation, adaptation, and finance. Article 6 of the Agreement aims at promoting integrated, holistic, and balanced approaches that will assist governments in implementing their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) through voluntary international cooperation.

⁶ G77 is a coalition of 134 developing countries, designed to promote its members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations.

⁷ Please see Annex 2 for a copy of the Philippines' National Statement delivered on November 9, 2021 by the Head of the Delegation. The National Statement was vetted by the Office of the President and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

- Pushing for a law banning single-use plastics; and
- Embarking on a project with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to accelerate the country's transition from coal to clean energy in a just and affordable manner.
- Coming into COP26, the Philippines expects the Meeting to be a platform towards concrete climate action, citing that it is already the 26th time Parties have met but little of the actions and funding promised have materialized.
- The Philippines calls for a framework on climate justice where the Western countries that have emitted and continue to emit the most GHGs accept the responsibility of financing the capacity development and technology transfer required for developing countries to pursue carbon neutrality through climate finance that is comprised of: grants, investments, and subsidies needed by the most vulnerable countries to adapt to climate change.

7. **G77 and China Coordination Meetings.** Members of the Philippine Delegation have raised the following points at the G77 and China Coordination Meetings, a number of which have been carried in the Opening Statement of the Chair of the G77 and China Group⁸:

- Reaffirmation of the Parties' commitment to common but differentiated responsibilities and to climate justice⁹;
- Demand for greater accountability from developed economies that contributed and continue to contribute the most GHG emissions¹⁰;
- Enhanced climate finance flows must be demand-driven and respond to the needs of developing countries¹¹;
- Need for a measurable, evidence-based, and transparent outcome so that Parties can report to stakeholders the impact of all programs and policies towards the climate goals;
- Transparency in climate finance flows and projects must take into account the needs of developing countries and must provide for flexibility in the reporting submissions of developing countries;
- Need for Parties to be prepared administratively in mobilizing funds;
- Climate projects should be tangible initiatives or have a pilot implementation to prove that the policy or program is working in the local context of developing and climate-vulnerable countries (i.e. beyond technical assistance);

⁸ Please see Annex 3 for a copy of the G77 and China Opening Statement.

⁹ Cited in Paragraph 5 of the Opening Statement

¹⁰ Cited in Paragraph 7 of the Opening Statement

¹¹ Cited in Paragraph 8 of the Opening Statement

- Concrete and tangible outcome from COP26 on the provision of public finance by developed country parties to developing countries to formulate and implement National Adaptation Plans (NAP)¹²; and
- Negotiations with respect to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be concluded at COP26 in a manner that ensures the diversity of NDCs, ensures environmental integrity, avoids double counting, promotes sustainable development, provides adequate and predictable funds for adaptation, and enables future cooperative arrangements among Parties¹³.

8. **Work Stream Discussions and Negotiations.** Further, Members of the Philippine Delegation have raised the following matters in the various Work Stream Discussions and Negotiations:

On Climate Finance¹⁴

- Climate Finance must take a blended approach of grants, investments, and subsidies to make it efficiently work for developed country beneficiaries (i.e. Non-Annex Parties).
 - **Grants** should be used to improve the capacity of local communities in climate-vulnerable areas to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures. These grants should come in the form of educational or technical assistance programs to help people conceive of and execute localized projects.
 - **Investments** should focus on adaptation and mitigation programs, projects, and activities that are bankable and will yield high returns. For instance, investments in solar power will unlock more business opportunities, create new jobs, and lead to energy self-reliance in the long run.
 - **Subsidies** are meant to support initiatives leading to the transition to a climate-resilient economy. This should address the financial costs and risks of such adjustments. For instance, we need to provide financial aid to communities during the transition period when they start to gradually shift to renewable energy sources replacing power plants that use fossil fuels.
- Climate finance is best channeled through multilateral development banks (MDBs) given that these institutions have extensive monitoring and vetting processes that would provide the “seal of good housekeeping”, which can consequently encourage private sector participation. MDBs can also be tapped to work with the COP for a harmonized set of guidelines to determine the viability and sustainability of climate projects as well as set transparency and accountability standards.

¹² Cited in Paragraph 15 of the Opening Statement

¹³ Cited in Paragraph 23 of the Opening Statement

¹⁴ These points were reiterated by the Undersigned in a letter to Rt. Honorable Amanda Milling, MP (Annex 4).

On Adaptation, Loss, and Damage

- Developing countries should be assisted in having transparent and evidence-based delivery of loss and damage-related technical assistance and other support from the developed countries under the Paris Agreement. It is likewise important to establish a system that would keep track of the progress made in addressing losses and damages.
- Provision of adequate risk management to attend to the increasing risk exposure of vulnerable countries to climate-induced hazards must also be facilitated.
- Support for risk transfer mechanisms such as but not limited to catastrophe bonds, parametric insurance, and forecast-based financing must be provided to climate vulnerable countries.
- The Santiago Network (for averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change) must have the following functions:
 - Identifying and communicating relevant technical assistance needs and priorities;
 - Connecting those seeking technical assistance with best-suited organizations, bodies, networks, and experts; and
 - Sourcing and accessing technical assistance available, including from such organizations, bodies, networks, and experts.

On Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

- The concept of “Emissions Avoidance” must be included as a mitigation option, particularly for developing countries that have contributed less to GHG emissions, to provide ample flexibility for these countries to reach higher levels of development, while transitioning to a low-carbon economy and implementing more sustainable practices.

RELEVANT KEY OUTCOMES OF COP26

9. Following the discussions, the UK Presidency has come up with the Glasgow Climate Pact¹⁵ citing the overarching agreements among the Parties participating in COP26 along with various decision documents per work stream. Relevant outcomes aligned with the Philippines’ positions and key messages are as follows:
 - MDBs, other financial institutions, and the private sector were called to enhance finance mobilization to deliver the scale of resources needed to achieve climate plans, particularly for adaptation;
 - MDBs and other financial institutions were urged to further scale up investments towards climate action;

¹⁵ Please see Annex 5 for a copy of the Glasgow Climate Pact

- Parties called for a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources globally, including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance;
- Goal of developed country Parties to mobilize USD 100 Billion per year by 2020 for climate finance was noted to have been unmet;
- Developed country Parties were urged to fully deliver on the USD 100 Billion goal urgently and through to 2025;
- Multilateral institutions were encouraged to consider how climate vulnerabilities should be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights;
- Functions and processes for further developing the institutional arrangements of the Santiago Network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change have been agreed upon; and
- The concept of “Emissions Avoidance” is potentially considered to be a mitigation option¹⁶.

10. In addition, other COP26 outcomes of interest to the Philippines are as follows:

- Reaffirmation of the long-term global goal to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;
- Parties will consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions such as methane;
- Parties agreed to revisit and strengthen in 2022 their current NDC emissions targets to 2030, through a yearly political roundtable in coming up with a global progress report and in holding a Leaders summit in 2023;
- Parties aim to accelerate the development, deployment, and dissemination of technologies and the adoption of policies to transition towards low-emission energy systems by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation through accelerating efforts towards the phase-down (a watered version of phase-out due to India and China’s position) of unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, as well as through energy efficiency measures;
- The Paris Rulebook, which serves as the guidelines on how to operationalize the Paris Agreement, was finally completed after six years of technical and political discussions;
- Parties, through the Standing Committee on Finance, will work on the definition of climate finance with a view to provide inputs for consideration at COP27 (November 2022); and
- Parties agreed to continue discussions on Long-term Climate Finance up to 2027.

¹⁶ Please refer to Paragraph 3(c) of CMA3 Decision on Article 6 (Annex 8)

OTHER COP26 RELATED MATTERS

11. Besides the discussions and negotiations, the undersigned together with Members of the Philippine Delegation attended various side events organized as a complement to the theme of climate action. A list of these events and the key messages delivered by the undersigned in these events are reported in Annex 9: Related Events and Key Messages at COP26.

12. Further, the Philippines endorsed the following Declarations that serve as complements to the actions contemplated in the Glasgow Climate Pact:

- Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forest and Land Use¹⁷
- Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement (endorsement of clause 1 and partial endorsement of clauses 2 and 4)¹⁸
- Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum¹⁹

Attachments:

Annex 1: Memo from the Office of the President on the Philippine Delegation to COP26

Annex 2: Philippines' National Statement

Annex 3: G77 and China Opening Statement

Annex 4: Letter to Rt. Hon. Amanda Milling, MP

Annex 5: Glasgow Climate Pact

Annex 6: COP26 Decision-Warsaw International Mechanism

Annex 7: CMA3 Decision-Warsaw International Mechanism

Annex 8: CMA3 Decision-Article 6

Annex 9: Related Messages and Key Events at COP26

Annex 10: Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forest and Land Use

Annex 11: Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement

Annex 12: Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum

Annex 13: COP 26 Decision – Long-Term Finance

¹⁷ Please see Annex 10 for a copy of the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forest and Land Use.

¹⁸ Please see Annex 11 for a copy of the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement.

¹⁹ Please see Annex 12 for a copy of the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum.



Office of the President
of the Philippines
Malacañang

ANNEX 1

MEMORANDUM FROM THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FOR : **SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ**
Chairperson Designate, Climate Change Commission
Department of Finance

CC : **SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR.**
Department of Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT : **PHILIPPINE DELEGATION TO THE 26TH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE OF
THE PARTIES (COP 26)**

DATE : **OCT 27 2021**

Upon your representations in the Memorandum for the President dated 21 October 2021, please be informed of the **APPROVAL** of the following as members of the Philippine Delegation to the COP 26:

1. Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez
Head of Delegation, Chief Negotiator and Official Representative of the President
2. Office of the President
 - a. Undersecretary Robert Eric A. Borje
3. Department of Finance
 - a. Undersecretary Mark Dennis Y.C. Joven
 - b. Assistant Secretary Paola Sherina A. Alvarez
 - c. Director Neil Adrian S. Cabiles
 - d. Ms. Jenevive M. Lontok
 - e. Ms. Sharmaine Dianne G. Ramirez
 - f. Mr. Nathan Eleizer R. Bayasen
 - g. Ms. Cherry Mae P. Gonzales
 - h. Mr. Martin Lorenzo E. Perez
4. Department of Foreign Affairs
 - a. Secretary Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr.
 - b. Mr. Antonio M. Lagdameo,
Philippine Ambassador to the United Kingdom
 - c. Ms. Leila C. Lora-Santos,
Philippine Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York
 - d. Assistant Secretary Maria Angela A. Ponce
 - e. Ms. Beatriz Alexandra G. Martinez
 - f. Mr. George Benedict C. Pineda




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5. Department of Energy
 - a. Undersecretary Felix William B. Fuentabella
 - b. Mr. Karlo Louise D. Matias
6. Department of Environment and Natural Resources
 - a. Director Albert A. Magalang

For information and appropriate action.

By authority of the President:



SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA

THE PHILIPPINES NATIONAL STATEMENT FOR THE COP 26 MEETING

Carlos G. Dominguez
Secretary of Finance
Chairman-Designate, Climate Change Commission
November 9, 2021

The Philippines is determined to be a world leader in this fight against climate change.

We account only for three-tenths of one percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, we bear the brunt of the consequences of climate change. Our country is sinking at a rate four times faster than the global average. Annually, we are confronted with increasingly severe typhoons, floods, and droughts. Millions of lives are at stake. Clearly, climate change is very real to the Philippines.

To challenge ourselves and the rest of the world, we set the boldest national goal put forward by any country. Under President Rodrigo Duterte's administration, the Philippines commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 75 percent in 2030.

We are moving ahead with urgency to fulfill our ambitious target. We shifted from theorizing about climate change to executing practical climate adaptation and mitigation projects on the ground. We have put together a group of Filipino experts who represent all corners of the Philippines to engage our fishermen and farmers and prepare them to execute localized action plans.

We just launched our Sustainable Finance Roadmap to deploy the engines of finance to get green projects moving across our archipelago. To urge the Filipino people to do their part on a daily basis in saving the world's environment, we are pushing for a law banning single-use plastics. We launched a partnership with the Asian Development Bank for a landmark project that will accelerate our transition from coal to clean energy. This comes after President Duterte declared a moratorium on new coal plants a year ago.

These are concrete actions to demonstrate to the world how a developing and climate-vulnerable country like the Philippines can lead in this fight to save our planet. This also shows that our commitments are not merely empty or half-baked promises, but are supported by actionable projects on the ground.

FINAL

We have very high expectations for this COP 26 to become not just merely an annual platform for discussion but a catalyst for concrete action plans.

It's time that we do some actual work on the ground and build a framework for climate justice. Those who have polluted and continue to pollute the Earth's environment through unthinking industrialization starting 200 years ago must pay for the grants, investments, and subsidies needed for the most vulnerable countries to adapt to climate change.

The time for debate is over. This is the time to finally begin acting on the fulfillment of our commitments and obligations to humanity.

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G77 AND CHINA OPENING STATEMENT
Joint Opening Plenary of the COP, CMA, SBSTA and SBI
COP26, CMP16, CMA3, SBSTA52-55, SBI52-55
31 October 2021, Glasgow

Version for Website Publication
(A shorter version will be delivered orally)

1. Distinguished Mr. President, Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies, Madame Executive Secretary, colleagues,
2. The Republic of Guinea is honoured to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. We assure you of the Group's commitment to contribute constructively to the success of COP26 for the collective benefit of our peoples and future generations. We would like to express sincere appreciation to the United Kingdom and the people of Glasgow for their generous hosting of COP26, despite the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has imposed.
3. The Group looks forward to concluding the work that has been pending since COP25 in Madrid in December 2019 despite the restrictions and limitations imposed by the pandemic on our modalities of work. In doing so, our proceedings must be balanced, inclusive, participatory, and transparent.
4. Sustainable development and poverty eradication are overriding priorities for developing countries. We come to this COP with a deep sense of urgency because we are deeply concerned about the increasing impacts of climate change on our socio-economic circumstances and development priorities and trajectories.
5. As the G77's Ministers stated in their November 2020 Ministerial Statement in New York, the Paris Agreement, adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is the collective achievement of all Parties. It seeks to enhance the implementation of the Convention, in accordance with its objectives, principles and provisions, in particular on the basis of equity, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, needs and priorities, and the right to development, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.
6. These principles are fundamental to our work. The balanced package in the Paris Agreement with respect to mitigation, adaptation, the provision of the means of implementation and support to developing countries, enhanced transparency, and international cooperation must be upheld and are not to be renegotiated nor reinterpreted.
7. The Group expects at this COP that developed countries fill deficiencies in their implementation of their pre-2020 commitments. Developed countries must undertake and increase the economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets in their NDCs and scale up their provision of support to developing countries.
8. Climate finance is key to success here at COP26 and the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. Long-standing climate finance commitments such as the USD100 billion goal by 2020 must now be fulfilled. We cannot rely on unfulfilled promises. We must see tangible actions from developed countries at this COP that translate into enhanced climate finance flows that are demand-driven and responsive to the needs of developing countries. These include real progress in our negotiations relating to the new finance goal. We note that the recently adopted Needs Determination Report and the Biennial Assessment and Overview on Climate Finance Flows from the Standing Committee on Finance have given us some key benchmarks on the scale of financing

that would need to be mobilized and delivered to support developing countries in implementing their NDCs.

9. For the Group, financial resources as well as technology development and transfer and capacity building are crucial enablers of climate action. Enhanced ambition must come with enhanced support. Provision of this support from developed countries is a binding commitment under the Convention and reconfirmed in the Paris Agreement. There are nearly 15 agenda items on finance at this COP; as such, no finance negotiations under different agenda items should be organized in parallel.
10. For the Group, Long Term Finance discussions are not about having an agenda of workshops and dialogues but should focus on how the long-standing climate finance commitments of developed countries established under the Convention and its Paris Agreement are being implemented. We expect that COP26 will decide on the continuation of the LTF Work Programme to contribute to scaling-up post-2020 climate financing and monitor the accomplishment of the USD 100 billion goal up to 2020 and to 2025.
11. The provision and mobilization of finance, technology and capacity building must be done in a transparent manner, must be new, additional, predictable, and consider the actual needs and priorities of developing countries. These must be reflected in the reporting of backward or forward-looking information under the Convention and its Paris Agreement, as well as in the initiation of the process in Glasgow to establish a new collective quantified climate finance goal based on a floor of US\$ 100 billion per year.
12. The reporting of the provision of finance by developed countries to developing countries should be improved, given concerns that climate finance is translating into increased external debt of developing countries. This includes improving the reporting of grant equivalency, climate specificity, and how developed countries are taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries and the provision of grant-based public resources under Article 9.4 and 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. The needs of developing countries with respect to financial support for loss and damage should also be discussed, including reporting by developed countries on the provision of such support.
13. The establishment of the new collective quantified finance goal must be the result of a transparent and inclusive process that is Party- driven, participatory, easily quantifiable, and concrete. The Group has been pressing for this process to begin since 2017. COP26 must result in a timeline that ensures the participation of all; that the new goal will reflect the needs of developing countries; and that it includes both a quantitative and qualitative component, including specific goals for adaptation and linkages to the Adaptation Fund to ensure predictability of financing for this Fund that is very important to developing countries.
14. The Group also wishes to reiterate the importance of ensuring that climate finance is not politicized and that all eligible developing countries can access all available financial resources of the implementing entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention and its Paris Agreement.
15. Adaptation is a critical priority for developing countries and must be treated in a balanced manner compared to mitigation actions. Our work on the global goal on adaptation under the Paris Agreement must advance. Support for adaptation actions in developing countries will be increasingly crucial for developing countries as the adverse effects of climate change scale up in the future. Hence, we would like to see concrete and tangible outcomes from COP26 on the provision of public, grant-based finance by developed countries to developing countries for adaptation action, including to formulate and implement NAPs as stipulated by the Convention.
16. Adaptation planning continues to be a priority to developing countries. It forms a critical foundation for building resilience in our countries. Progress on adaptation planning in our

countries has not been encouraging as many developing countries have still not formulated or implemented their adaptation plans.

17. Fully realized technology development and transfer is of vital importance to improve resilience for developing countries. The Technology Mechanism must be strengthened to serve such purpose and to implement the technology framework. We are deeply concerned with the slow progress made in climate-related technology transfer to developing countries and the challenges faced by the operational arm of the technology mechanism, the CTCN in securing stable and sustainable financial resources. We call on developed countries to enhance their efforts in technology transfer and strengthen their support to CTCN through the provision of financial and other resources, to enable enhanced actions on technology development and transfer in implementing the Convention and its Paris Agreement. We look forward to satisfactory results from a CTCN Donor Roundtable on 8 November 2021 in Glasgow as a first step to such enhanced support.
18. Capacity building is a critical enabler for developing countries to meet their climate actions. Significant progress has been registered at the previous sessions and we hope that we can build on that to finalise the work at hand. We look forward to engaging constructively with the view of concluding the fourth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol and the Annual progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity Building for 2020 and 2021, including its recommendations to the COP and the CMA.
19. On the Koronivia work programme on agriculture, we believe the discussions that we had for the last four years should pave the way for a tangible output after the conclusion of the Koronivia road map. Parties should report back to COP26 on the final outcome to define the way forward for implementation focusing on enhancing adaptation and adaptation co-benefits in agriculture, while promoting sustainable development and increasing productivity of the agricultural sector to ensure food security in all countries, particularly in developing countries, to fight hunger and eradicate poverty, taking into consideration the diversity of the agricultural systems around the globe and the differences in scale.
20. On response measures, the work plan activities of the response measure forum and the KCI should be fully implemented. Time lost to date and activities not implemented in 2020 must be fully made up. The Forum and the KCI need to be given sufficient time and space to advance their work and ensure effective treatment of response measures-related issues under the Paris Agreement.
21. The agenda items on loss and damage under the COP, CMA and SBs are important to the Group. This includes the report of the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism on Loss and Damage and on the joint governance of the COP and CMA over the WIM. The treatment of loss and damage-related agenda items under the COP and the CMA must be balanced to reflect their joint governance. COP26 should deliver on ensuring that the WIM through its Executive Committee and the Santiago Network becomes an effective mechanism under the Convention and its Paris Agreement for addressing the needs of developing countries, especially for enhanced action and support in relation to loss and damage, including loss and damage-related financing and technology transfer.
22. Our work on transparency must be completed as per the mandate. Developing countries' best efforts at reporting at a higher standard of transparency, once the reporting tools are completed, must be accompanied by real support from developed countries. Access by developing countries to adequate and timely support for transparency should be facilitated. We also call for Annex I Parties to submit their reports required under the Convention in a timely manner, including reports that were missing from previous reporting cycles.
23. The negotiations with respect to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be concluded at COP26 in a manner that ensures that there is a balanced outcome under Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8, ensures environmental integrity, avoids double counting, promotes sustainable development, provides

adequate and predictable funds for adaptation, and enables future cooperative arrangements among Parties through the nationally appropriate use of both market and non-market approaches.

24. The Group of 77 and China in the spirit of inclusiveness and leaving no one behind calls for the full and effective implementation of the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change and its Gender Action Plan. We call for continued efforts in ensuring gender parity in national delegations and in all constituted bodies of the Convention and its Paris Agreement.
25. The Group looks forward to the start of the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement. We wish to highlight the importance of having diverse, balanced, and comprehensive inputs for the GST in all the thematic areas, particularly from developing countries and the need to facilitate the participation of non-party stakeholders from developing countries. We expect that the GST will be undertaken in a holistic, systemic, comprehensive, and facilitative manner, considering all thematic areas, including mitigation, adaptation, the means of implementation and support, the consequences of response measures, and loss and damage, in the light of equity and the best available science. The GST process should enable us to look backward at implementation gaps and challenges, including with respect to historical responsibility and pre-2020 implementation of the Convention, and to look forward in terms of what must be done and how these would be addressed in a systemic and transformative way.
26. The Group's Ministerial Statement of November 2020 reaffirmed that the imposition of coercive economic measures, including unilateral sanctions, against developing countries does not contribute to economic and social development, including dialogue and understanding among countries. These actions adversely affect the capabilities of developing countries to finance their efforts in mitigation and adaptation to climate change and hinder their right to access available resources.
27. The program budget for the biennium 2022-2023 should reflect a balance between adaptation and mitigation, with the adaptation-related budget being funded from the core budget rather than be subject to the uncertainty of the supplementary budget.
28. For the Group, it is also important to consider how to best advance ocean-climate and land-climate issues and solutions in relation to the work and processes under the UNFCCC.
29. Finally, rest assured, Mr. Presidency, that the Group of 77 and China will work with you and our partners for the successful conclusion of COP26, in a manner that moves us all forward in meeting the objective of the Convention and the goals of its Paris Agreement in an equitable manner that respects the principles of the Convention and the balanced package under its Paris Agreement.
30. Thank you, Mr. President.



Republic of the Philippines
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

Roxas Boulevard Corner Pablo Ocampo, Sr. Street
Manila 1004

ANNEX 4

RT. HON. AMANDA MILLING, MP.

Minister of State for Asia
King Charles St, Whitehall, London SW1A 2AH
United Kingdom

Dear **Minister Milling**:

Thank you for our productive discussion on November 8, 2021 at the sidelines of the COP26 meeting. As mentioned, this conference has been an eye-opener for me of how COP has not been an effective platform to address climate change. This has been the 26th time that the COP has met, yet little action has been taken. The period for merely talking about climate change should now move towards the implementation of actual projects.

Finance plays an indispensable role in making climate adaptation and mitigation projects possible to roll out on the ground. It is therefore important that we must first have a clear definition of what constitutes climate finance, which the COP had continuously failed to take into account. As mentioned, climate finance should be a mix of grants for capacity building, investments for green projects, and most importantly, subsidies that should address the financial costs and risks of communities transitioning to a climate-resilient economy. As these funds are ultimately from taxpayers, accountability and transparency are paramount to ensure the prudent use of such funds.

The Philippines is firm in its position that those who have emitted and continue to emit the most greenhouse gases must bear the largest financial burden in the transition to carbon neutrality. We, however, will not wait for the western nations to get their act together. We are moving ahead with the implementation of actual projects on the ground to enable us to meet our climate commitments.

As the host of this year's COP, the UK Government should take a closer look at practical approaches to mobilize climate finance. As discussed, the UK must encourage multilateral development banks (MDBs) to catalyze financial flows to developing countries in order to meet our climate change objectives.

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Given the extensive monitoring and well-established vetting processes, the World Bank Group (WBG), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are in the best position to provide the seal of good housekeeping that would spur private sector investment in green projects. The UK must use these MDBs to set up a harmonized set of guidelines to determine the viability and sustainability of climate projects. The MDBs can set the standards for transparency and accountability, and work together with other institutions around the world in ensuring that such standards and guidelines are adopted.

With the rethinking of these standards, the MDBs can play a pivotal role in mobilizing the trillions of dollars in private sector financing available for climate adaptation and mitigation projects. This is certainly a practical approach than just annually convening the COP, which is largely focused on negotiations without concrete actions.

On another note, we look forward to the UK Government's agreement on the proposed Government-to-Government Framework that will serve as a basis for the Philippine Government to tap official development assistance (ODA) loans from the UK.

We are keen on having more fruitful engagements with the UK Government, particularly in moving forward our ambitious commitments to address climate change.

Very truly yours,


CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ
Secretary of Finance
NOV 10 2021



Copy furnished:

HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR.
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

H.E. ANTONIO LAGDAMEO
Philippine Ambassador to the UK

H.E. LAURE BEAUFILS
UK Ambassador Designate to the Philippines

HON. KEN O'FLAHERTY
COP Regional Ambassador for Asia

Advance unedited version

Decision -/CP.26

Glasgow Climate Pact

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.19, 1/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 1/CP.22, 1/CP.23, 1/CP.24 and 1/CP.25,

Noting decisions 1/CMP.16 and 1/CMA.3,

Recognizing the role of multilateralism and the Convention, including its processes and principles, and the importance of international cooperation in addressing climate change and its impacts, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,

Acknowledging the devastating impacts of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic and the importance of ensuring a sustainable, resilient and inclusive global recovery, showing solidarity particularly with developing country Parties,

Recognizing the important advances made through the UNFCCC multilateral process since 1994, including in the context of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and *also noting* the importance for some of the concept of 'climate justice', when taking action to address climate change,

Expressing appreciation to the Heads of State and Government who participated in the World Leaders Summit in Glasgow and for the increased targets and actions announced and the commitments made to work together and with non-Party stakeholders to accelerate sectoral action by 2030,

Recognizing the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change, and *highlighting* the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action,

Recognizing the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss, and the critical role of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems in delivering benefits for climate adaptation and mitigation, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards,

I. Science and urgency

1. *Recognizes* the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking;

2. *Welcomes* the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report¹ and the recent global and regional reports on the state of the climate from the World Meteorological Organization, and *invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present its forthcoming reports to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in 2022;
3. *Expresses alarm and utmost concern* that human activities have caused around 1.1 °C of global warming to date and that impacts are already being felt in every region;
4. *Stresses* the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address gaps between current efforts and pathways in pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention and its long-term global goal;

II. Adaptation

5. *Notes with serious concern* the findings from the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, including that climate and weather extremes and their adverse impacts on people and nature will continue to increase with every additional increment of rising temperatures;
6. *Emphasizes* the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity-building and technology transfer, to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change in line with the best available science, taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties;
7. *Welcomes* the national adaptation plans submitted to date, which enhance the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions and priorities;
8. *Urges* Parties to further integrate adaptation into local, national and regional planning;
9. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session (November 2022) the findings from the contribution of Working Group II to its Sixth Assessment Report, including those relevant to assessing adaptation needs, and *calls upon* the research community to further the understanding of global, regional and local impacts of climate change, response options and adaptation needs;

III. Adaptation finance

10. *Notes with concern* that the current provision of climate finance for adaptation remains insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties;
11. *Urges* developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the needs of developing country Parties as part of a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans;
12. *Recognizes* the importance of the adequacy and predictability of adaptation finance, including the value of the Adaptation Fund in delivering dedicated support for adaptation;
13. *Welcomes* the recent pledges made by many developed country Parties to increase their provision of climate finance to support adaptation in developing country Parties in

¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2021. *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, A Pirani, et al. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/>.

response to their growing needs, including contributions made to the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, which represent significant progress compared with previous efforts;

14. *Calls upon* multilateral development banks, other financial institutions and the private sector to enhance finance mobilization in order to deliver the scale of resources needed to achieve climate plans, particularly for adaptation, and *encourages* Parties to continue to explore innovative approaches and instruments for mobilizing finance for adaptation from private sources;

IV. Mitigation

15. *Reaffirms* the long-term global goal to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

16. *Recognizes* that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C, and *resolves* to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C;

17. *Also recognizes* that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases;

18. *Further recognizes* that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

19. *Invites* Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane;

20. *Calls upon* Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;

21. *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems, including forests and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems, to achieve the long-term global goal of the Convention by acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and protecting biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards;

V. Finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for mitigation and adaptation

22. *Urges* developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention, and *encourages* other Parties to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

23. *Notes with concern* the growing needs of developing country Parties, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness as a consequence of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic;
24. *Welcomes* the first report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement² and the fourth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows³ by the Standing Committee on Finance;
25. *Emphasizes* the need to mobilize climate finance from all sources to reach the level needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, including significantly increasing support for developing country Parties, beyond USD 100 billion per year;
26. *Notes with deep regret* that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not yet been met, and *welcomes* the increased pledges made by many developed country Parties and the *Climate Finance Delivery Plan: Meeting the US\$100 Billion Goal*⁴ and the collective actions contained therein;
27. *Urges* developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through to 2025, and *emphasizes* the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges;
28. *Urges* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, multilateral development banks and other financial institutions to further scale up investments in climate action, and *calls for* a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources globally, including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance;
29. *Re-emphasizes* the need for scaled-up financial resources to take into account the needs of those countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and in this regard *encourages* relevant multilateral institutions to consider how climate vulnerabilities should be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights;
30. *Emphasizes* the challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing finance and *encourages* further efforts to enhance access to finance, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism;
31. *Notes* the specific concerns raised with regard to eligibility and ability to access concessional forms of climate finance, and *re-emphasizes* the importance of the provision of scaled-up financial resources, taking into account the needs of developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
32. *Encourages* relevant providers of financial support to consider how vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change could be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and how they could simplify and enhance access to finance;
33. *Acknowledges* the progress made on capacity-building, particularly in relation to enhancing the coherence and coordination of capacity-building activities towards the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement;
34. *Recognizes* the need to continue supporting developing country Parties in identifying and addressing both current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs, and to catalyse climate action and solutions to respond;

² See document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2.

³ See document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1.

⁴ Available at <https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf>.

35. *Welcomes* the joint annual reports of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2020 and 2021⁵ and *invites* the two bodies to strengthen their collaboration;

36. *Emphasizes* the importance of strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation action, including accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation, and the importance of predictable, sustainable and adequate funding from diverse sources for the Technology Mechanism;

VI. Loss and damage

37. *Acknowledges* that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage and that, as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat;

38. *Also acknowledges* the important role of a broad range of stakeholders at the local, national and regional level, including indigenous peoples and local communities, in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

39. *Reiterates* the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects;

40. *Urges* developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations entities and intergovernmental organizations and other bilateral and multilateral institutions, including non-governmental organizations and private sources, to provide enhanced and additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

41. *Recognizes* the importance of demand-driven technical assistance in building capacity to implement approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

42. *Welcomes* the further operationalization of the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including the agreement on its functions and process for further developing its institutional arrangements;

43. *Endorses* paragraphs 67–70 and 73–74 of decision -/CMA.3;^{6, 7}

44. *Acknowledges* the importance of coherent action to respond to the scale of needs caused by the adverse impacts of climate change;

45. *Resolves* to strengthen partnerships between developing and developed countries, funds, technical agencies, civil society and communities to enhance understanding of how approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage can be improved;

⁵ FCCC/SB/2020/4 and FCCC/SB/2021/5.

⁶ Draft decision entitled “Glasgow Climate Pact” proposed under agenda item 2(c) of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its third session.

⁷ It is noted that discussions related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts did not produce an outcome: this is without prejudice to further consideration of this matter.

VII. Implementation

46. *Recalls* that the round tables among Parties and non-Party stakeholders on pre-2020 implementation and ambition held in 2018, 2019 and 2020 helped to highlight and enhance understanding of the efforts of and challenges faced by Parties in relation to action and support in the pre-2020 period, as well as of the work of the constituted bodies in that period;
47. *Strongly urges* all Parties that have not yet done so to meet any outstanding pledges under the Convention as soon as possible;
48. *Welcomes* the action taken to unlock the potential for sectoral action to contribute to fulfilling and implementing national targets, particularly in emission-intensive sectors;
49. *Recognizes* the need to take into consideration the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties, in line with Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 10, of the Convention;
50. *Also recognizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring ecosystems to deliver crucial services, including acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts and supporting sustainable livelihoods, including for indigenous peoples and local communities;
51. *Encourages* Parties to take an integrated approach to addressing the issues referred to in paragraph 50 above in national and local policy and planning decisions;
52. *Recognizes* the need to ensure just transitions that promote sustainable development and eradication of poverty, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs, including through making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development, including through deployment and transfer of technology, and provision of support to developing country Parties;

VIII. Collaboration

53. *Recognizes* the importance of international collaboration on innovative climate action, including technological advancement, across all actors of society, sectors and regions, in contributing to progress towards the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement;
54. *Recalls* Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention and the importance of cooperation to address climate change and support sustainable economic growth and development;
55. *Recognizes* the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement;
56. *Welcomes* the improvement of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action⁸ for enhancing ambition, the leadership and actions of the high-level champions, and the work of the secretariat on the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action platform to support accountability and track progress of voluntary initiatives;
57. *Also welcomes* the high-level communiqué⁹ on the regional climate weeks and *encourages* the continuation of regional climate weeks where Parties and non-Party

⁸ Available at <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Improved%20Marrakech%20Partnership%202021-2025.pdf>.

⁹ Available at <https://unfccc.int/regional-climate-weeks/rcw-2021-cop26-communique>.

stakeholders can strengthen their credible and durable response to climate change at the regional level;

58. *Further welcomes* the informal summary reports by the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the ocean and climate change dialogue to consider how to strengthen adaptation and mitigation action and on the dialogue on the relationship between land and climate change adaptation related matters;

59. *Invites* Parties to submit views on how to enhance climate action on land under the existing UNFCCC programmes and activities in paragraph 75 of the report on the dialogue on the relationship between land and climate change adaptation related matters referred to in paragraph 58 above, and *requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to prepare an informal summary report thereon and make it available to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session;

60. *Invites* the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC to consider how to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action in their existing mandates and workplans and to report on these activities within the existing reporting processes, as appropriate;

61. *Also invites* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to hold an annual dialogue, starting at the fifty-sixth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (June 2022), to strengthen ocean-based action and to prepare an informal summary report thereon and make it available to the Conference of the Parties at its subsequent session;

62. *Urges* Parties to swiftly begin implementing the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment, respecting, promoting and considering their respective obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women;

63. *Expresses appreciation* for the outcomes of the sixteenth Conference of Youth, organized by the constituency of children and youth non-governmental organizations and held in Glasgow in October 2021, and the “Youth4Climate2021: Driving Ambition” event hosted by Italy in Milan, Italy, in September 2021;

64. *Urges* Parties and stakeholders to ensure meaningful youth participation and representation in multilateral, national and local decision-making processes, including under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

65. *Invites* future Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties, with the support of the secretariat, to facilitate the organization of an annual youth-led climate forum for dialogue between Parties and youth in collaboration with the UNFCCC children and youth constituency and other youth organizations with a view to contributing to the implementation of the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment;

66. *Emphasizes* the important role of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ culture and knowledge in effective action on climate change, and *urges* Parties to actively involve indigenous peoples and local communities in designing and implementing climate action and to engage with the second three-year workplan for implementing the functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, for 2022–2024;

67. *Expresses its recognition* for the important role the observer organizations play, including the nine non-governmental organization constituencies, in sharing their knowledge, and their calls to see ambitious action to meet the objectives of the Convention and collaborating with Parties to that end;

68. *Encourages* Parties to increase the full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action and to ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, which are vital for raising ambition and achieving climate goals;

69. *Calls upon* Parties to strengthen their implementation of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan;¹⁰

70. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

71. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

¹⁰ Decision 3/CP.25.

Advance unedited version

Decision -/CP.26

Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

The Conference of the Parties,

Endorses decision -/CMA.3,¹ on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts and the reports² of its Executive Committee, which provides as follows:

“1. *Welcomes* the reports of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts for 2020³ and 2021,⁴ including the recommendations contained therein;

“2. *Also welcomes* the continued progress of the Executive Committee in implementing its five-year rolling workplan and that of its expert groups in implementing their plans of action, including in response to the relevant outcomes of the 2019 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism, despite the extraordinary challenges due to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic;

“3. *Further welcomes:*

(a) The adoption by the Executive Committee of the plans of action of its expert groups on non-economic losses, slow onset events, and action and support, and the continued progress of implementation of the plans of action of the task force on displacement and the technical expert group on comprehensive risk management;

(b) The decision of the Executive Committee to update its five-year rolling workplan in 2022;

(c) The provision of input to the Standing Committee on Finance relating to the draft guidance for the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism;

(d) The progress of the Executive Committee, further to decision 19/CMA.1, in preparing its contribution for the technical assessment component of the global stocktake;

“4. *Encourages* the *Executive Committee* to:

(a) Include in its contribution referred to in paragraph 3(d) above, to the extent possible, information on challenges, opportunities, best practices and lessons learned in implementing the functions of the Warsaw International Mechanism as well as on activities and products relevant to the loss and damage considerations under the global stocktake, including in the context of decision 19/CMA.1, paragraphs 6(b)(ii) and 36(e);

¹ Draft decision entitled “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” proposed under agenda item 7 of the Conference of the Parties serving as meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its third session.

² FCCC/SB/2020/3 and FCCC/SB/2021/4 and Add.1–2.

³ FCCC/SB/2020/3.

⁴ FCCC/SB/2021/4 and Add.1–2.

(b) Consider including in the agendas for its regular meetings a standing item on how the latest climate science can inform policymaking;

“5. *Expresses appreciation to:*

(a) Organizations and other stakeholders that contributed to the success of the work undertaken and to the constituted bodies that collaborated with the Executive Committee and its expert groups in 2020–2021;

(b) Organizations that have submitted information pursuant to decision 2/CMA.2, paragraph 44;

“6. *Invites organizations, bodies, networks and experts to include the following when reporting on the technical assistance provided to developing countries⁵ with the aim of enhancing the information captured in the reports of the Executive Committee:*

(a) The type of technical assistance provided;

(b) The developing countries to which technical assistance was provided and when;

(c) The involvement of and collaboration among stakeholders at the local, subnational, national, regional and international level, as applicable;

(d) Challenges experienced in providing technical assistance;

(e) The ways in which countries may access the technical assistance available;

“7. *Encourages, noting the breadth of topics addressed in the strategic workstreams⁶ of the Executive Committee, a broad range of organizations, bodies, networks and experts from all regions, working at the local, subnational, national, regional and international level, including those in developing countries and those that are represented in the expert groups of the Executive Committee, to engage in the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change while avoiding duplication of their ongoing efforts;*

“8. *Acknowledges that the entities referred to in paragraph 7 above, particularly those that are based in developing countries, may need support, including financial support, in providing technical assistance;*

“9. *Decides that the Santiago network is to have the following functions:*

(a) Contributing to the effective implementation of the functions⁷ of the Warsaw International Mechanism, in line with the provisions in paragraph 7 of decision 2/CP.19 and Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, by catalysing the technical assistance of organizations, bodies, networks and experts;

(b) Catalysing demand-driven technical assistance including of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change by assisting in:

(i) Identifying, prioritizing and communicating technical assistance needs and priorities;

⁵ As per decision 2/CMA.2, para. 44.

⁶ As contained in the annex to document FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1.

⁷ Decision 2/CP.19, para. 5.

- (ii) Identifying types of relevant technical assistance;
- (iii) Actively connecting those seeking technical assistance with best suited organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
- (iv) Accessing technical assistance available including from such organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
- (c) Facilitating the consideration of a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage approaches, including but not limited to current and future impacts, priorities, and actions related to averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage pursuant to decisions 3/CP.18, and 2/CP.19, the areas referred to in Article 8, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement and the strategic workstreams of the five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee;
- (d) Facilitating and catalysing collaboration, coordination, coherence and synergies to accelerate action by organizations, bodies, networks and experts, across communities of practices, and for them to deliver effective and efficient technical assistance to developing countries;
- (e) Facilitating the development, provision and dissemination of, and access to, knowledge and information on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, including comprehensive risk management approaches, at the regional, national and local level;
- (f) Facilitating, through catalysing technical assistance, of organizations, bodies, networks and experts, access to action and support (finance, technology and capacity building) under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement, relevant to averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including urgent and timely responses to the impacts of climate change;

“10. *Also decides* to further *develop* the institutional arrangements of the Santiago network by:

- (a) Inviting Parties and relevant organizations to submit via the submission portal⁸ by 15 March 2022 their views on the following aspects of the Santiago network:
 - (i) Operational modalities;
 - (ii) Structure;
 - (iii) The role of the Executive Committee and its expert groups, task force and technical expert group;
 - (iv) The role of loss and damage contact points and other relevant stakeholders at the subnational, national and regional level;
 - (v) Possible elements for the terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body that may provide secretarial services to facilitate work under the Santiago network;
- (b) Requesting the secretariat to organize a technical workshop⁹ prior to the fifty-sixth sessions of the subsidiary bodies, under the guidance of the Chairs of those bodies, with inputs from the Executive Committee and the participation of Parties and

⁸ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

⁹ With the workshop to be held in a hybrid in-person and virtual format to encourage broad participation.

relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, to elaborate on the submissions referred to in paragraph 10(a) above;

(c) Requesting the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at their fifty-sixth sessions, to consider the submissions referred to in paragraph 10(a) above and the discussions at the technical workshop referred to in paragraph 10(b) above with a view to providing recommendations for consideration and adoption by the governing body at its next session or the governing bodies at their next session;

“11. *Requests* the secretariat to continue providing support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change that may seek or wish to benefit from the *technical* assistance available from organizations, bodies, networks and experts under the Santiago network without prejudice to the outcomes of the consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of matters relating to the network;

“12. *Encourages*, recognizing the urgent need for scaling-up of action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology and capacity-building, for the implementation of relevant approaches¹⁰ to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing *countries* that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, the Executive Committee, on the basis of its recommendation, to:

(a) Continue engaging and strengthening its dialogue with the Standing Committee on Finance, including by providing input to the Standing Committee on Finance when, in accordance with its mandate, it provides information, recommendations and draft guidance relating to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as appropriate;

(b) Commence, continue and/or explore potential ways to enhance, as appropriate, collaboration with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to inform the work of the Executive Committee and its expert group on action and support;

“13. *Notes* that considerations related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism will continue at its fourth session (November 2022);¹¹

“14. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

“15. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken *subject* to the availability of financial resources.”;

Notes that considerations related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism will continue at its twenty-seventh session (November 2022).¹²

¹⁰ Relevant approaches for, inter alia, slow onset events, non-economic losses and human mobility.

¹¹ It is noted that discussions on governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism did not produce an outcome; this is without prejudice to further consideration of this matter.

¹² It is noted that discussions on the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism did not produce an outcome; this is without prejudice to further consideration of this matter.

Advance unedited version

Decision -/CMA.3

Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

*The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,*¹

Recalling decision 2/CP.19, whereby the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts was established to address loss and damage associated with the impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,

Also recalling decisions 3/CP.18, 2/CP.19, 2/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 2/CP.21, 3/CP.22, 4/CP.22, 5/CP.23, 10/CP.24, 2/CP.25 and 2/CMA.2,

Being aware of the relevant provisions of decisions 18/CMA.1 and 19/CMA.1,

Recalling Article 8 of the Paris Agreement,

Also recalling decision 2/CMA.2, noted in decision 2/CP.25, whereby the next review of the Warsaw International Mechanism was recommended to be held in 2024 and every five years thereafter,

Acknowledging the efforts of the Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions between those sessions concerning the Santiago network,

Noting the increasing urgency of enhancing efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage in the light of continued global warming and its significant impacts on vulnerable populations and the ecosystems on which they depend, as illustrated by the findings of the latest scientific reports, including the contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,

1. *Welcomes* the reports of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts for 2020² and 2021,³ including the recommendations contained therein;
2. *Also welcomes* the continued progress of the Executive Committee in implementing its five-year rolling workplan and that of its expert groups in implementing their plans of action, including in response to the relevant outcomes of the 2019 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism, despite the extraordinary challenges due to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic;
3. *Further welcomes:*
 - (a) The adoption by the Executive Committee of the plans of action of its expert groups on non-economic losses, slow onset events, and action and support, and the continued

¹ Nothing in this document prejudices Parties' views or prejudices outcomes on matters related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.

² FCCC/SB/2020/3.

³ FCCC/SB/2021/4 and Add.1–2.

progress of implementation of the plans of action of the task force on displacement and the technical expert group on comprehensive risk management;

(b) The decision of the Executive Committee to update its five-year rolling workplan in 2022;

(c) The provision of input to the Standing Committee on Finance relating to the draft guidance for the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism;

(d) The progress of the Executive Committee, further to decision 19/CMA.1, in preparing its contribution for the technical assessment component of the global stocktake;

4. *Encourages* the Executive Committee to:

(a) Include in its contribution referred to in paragraph 3(d) above, to the extent possible, information on challenges, opportunities, best practices and lessons learned in implementing the functions of the Warsaw International Mechanism as well as on activities and products relevant to the loss and damage considerations under the global stocktake, including in the context of decision 19/CMA.1, paragraphs 6(b)(ii) and 36(e);

(b) Consider including in the agendas for its regular meetings a standing item on how the latest climate science can inform policymaking;

5. *Expresses appreciation* to:

(a) Organizations and other stakeholders that contributed to the success of the work undertaken and to the constituted bodies that collaborated with the Executive Committee and its expert groups in 2020–2021;

(b) Organizations that have submitted information pursuant to decision 2/CMA.2, paragraph 44;

6. *Invites* organizations, bodies, networks and experts to include the following when reporting on the technical assistance provided to developing countries⁴ with the aim of enhancing the information captured in the reports of the Executive Committee:

(a) The type of technical assistance provided;

(b) The developing countries to which technical assistance was provided and when;

(c) The involvement of and collaboration among stakeholders at the local, subnational, national, regional and international level, as applicable;

(d) Challenges experienced in providing technical assistance;

(e) The ways in which countries may access the technical assistance available;

7. *Encourages*, noting the breadth of topics addressed in the strategic workstreams⁵ of the Executive Committee, a broad range of organizations, bodies, networks and experts from all regions, working at the local, subnational, national, regional and international level, including those in developing countries and those that are represented in the expert groups of the Executive Committee, to engage in the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change while avoiding duplication of their ongoing efforts;

⁴ As per decision 2/CMA.2, para. 44.

⁵ As contained in the annex to document FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1.

8. *Acknowledges* that the entities referred to in paragraph 7 above, particularly those that are based in developing countries, may need support, including financial support, in providing technical assistance;
9. *Decides* that the Santiago network is to have the following functions:
- (a) Contributing to the effective implementation of the functions⁶ of the Warsaw International Mechanism, in line with the provisions in paragraph 7 of decision 2/CP.19 and Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, by catalysing the technical assistance of organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
 - (b) Catalysing demand-driven technical assistance including of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change by assisting in:
 - (i) Identifying, prioritizing and communicating technical assistance needs and priorities;
 - (ii) Identifying types of relevant technical assistance;
 - (iii) Actively connecting those seeking technical assistance with best suited organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
 - (iv) Accessing technical assistance available including from such organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
 - (c) Facilitating the consideration of a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage approaches, including but not limited to current and future impacts, priorities, and actions related to averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage pursuant to decisions 3/CP.18, and 2/CP.19, the areas referred to in Article 8, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement and the strategic workstreams of the five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee;
 - (d) Facilitating and catalysing collaboration, coordination, coherence and synergies to accelerate action by organizations, bodies, networks and experts, across communities of practices, and for them to deliver effective and efficient technical assistance to developing countries;
 - (e) Facilitating the development, provision and dissemination of, and access to, knowledge and information on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, including comprehensive risk management approaches, at the regional, national and local level;
 - (f) Facilitating, through catalysing technical assistance, of organizations, bodies, networks and experts, access to action and support (finance, technology and capacity building) under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement, relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including urgent and timely responses to the impacts of climate change;
10. *Also decides* to further develop the institutional arrangements of the Santiago network by:
- (a) Inviting Parties and relevant organizations to submit via the submission portal⁷ by 15 March 2022 their views on the following aspects of the Santiago network:
 - (i) Operational modalities;

⁶ Decision 2/CP.19, para. 5.

⁷ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

- (ii) Structure;
 - (iii) The role of the Executive Committee and its expert groups, task force and technical expert group;
 - (iv) The role of loss and damage contact points and other relevant stakeholders at the subnational, national and regional level;
 - (v) Possible elements for the terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body that may provide secretarial services to facilitate work under the Santiago network;
- (b) Requesting the secretariat to organize a technical workshop⁸ prior to the fifty-sixth sessions of the subsidiary bodies, under the guidance of the Chairs of those bodies, with inputs from the Executive Committee and the participation of Parties and relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, to elaborate on the submissions referred to in paragraph 10(a) above;
- (c) Requesting the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at their fifty-sixth sessions, to consider the submissions referred to in paragraph 10(a) above and the discussions at the technical workshop referred to in paragraph 10(b) above with a view to providing recommendations for consideration and adoption by the governing body at its next session or the governing bodies at their next session;
11. *Requests* the secretariat to continue providing support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change that may seek or wish to benefit from the technical assistance available from organizations, bodies, networks and experts under the Santiago network without prejudice to the outcomes of the consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of matters relating to the network;
12. *Encourages*, recognizing the urgent need for scaling-up of action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology and capacity-building, for the implementation of relevant approaches⁹ to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, the Executive Committee, on the basis of its recommendation, to:
- (a) Continue engaging and strengthening its dialogue with the Standing Committee on Finance, including by providing input to the Standing Committee on Finance when, in accordance with its mandate, it provides information, recommendations and draft guidance relating to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as appropriate;
 - (b) Commence, continue and/or explore potential ways to enhance, as appropriate, collaboration with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to inform the work of the Executive Committee and its expert group on action and support;
13. *Notes* that considerations related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism will continue at its fourth session (November 2022);¹⁰
14. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

⁸ With the workshop to be held in a hybrid in-person and virtual format to encourage broad participation.

⁹ Relevant approaches for, inter alia, slow onset events, non-economic losses and human mobility.

¹⁰ It is noted that discussions on governance of the WIM did not produce an outcome; this is without prejudice to further consideration of this matter.

15. *Requests that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources*

Advance unedited version

Decision -/CMA.3

Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,

Recalling the Paris Agreement,

Also recalling the tenth preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement, which takes into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities,

Further recalling the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement, acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Recalling Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21,

Also recalling Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement,

Further recalling Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 36, decision 8/CMA.1 and decision 9/CMA.2,

Cognizant of decision -/CMA.3,¹

1. *Adopts* the guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article² 6, paragraph 2, as contained in the annex;
2. *Clarifies* that the annex requires information to be reported in the structured summary pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1 (Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement), annex, paragraph 77(d), including the information to be reported as per paragraph 77(d)(iii);
3. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to undertake the following work, on the basis of the guidance in the annex, to develop recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session (November 2022) on:
 - (a) The special circumstances of the least developed countries and small island developing States;
 - (b) Elaboration of further guidance in relation to corresponding adjustments for multi-year and single-year nationally determined contributions, in a manner that ensures the avoidance of double counting, on:
 - (i) Methods for establishing an indicative trajectory, trajectories or budgets and for averaging, including with respect to relevant indicators, and for calculating cumulative emissions by sources and removals by sinks;

¹ Draft decision entitled “Guidance operationalizing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” proposed under agenda item 5 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its third session.

² “Article” refers to an Article of the Paris Agreement, unless otherwise specified.

- (ii) Methods to demonstrate the representativeness of averaging for corresponding adjustments by quantifying how much the yearly transaction volume differs from the average for the period;
 - (c) Consideration of whether internationally transferred mitigation outcomes could include emission avoidance;
- 4. *Invites* submissions from Parties on options for the tables and outlines for the information required pursuant to chapter IV of the annex (Reporting), by 31 March 2022 via the submission portal;³
- 5. *Requests* the secretariat to organize a technical workshop, ensuring broad participation of Parties, to develop options for the tables and outlines for the information required pursuant to chapter IV of the annex (Reporting), including the agreed electronic format referred to in chapter IV.B of the annex (Annual information), on the basis of the information in those chapters, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at its fifty-sixth session (June 2022);
- 6. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop tables and outlines for the information required pursuant to chapter IV of the annex (Reporting), including the agreed electronic format referred to in chapter IV.B of the annex (Annual information), on the basis of the submissions referred to in paragraph 4 above and taking into account the options developed pursuant to paragraph 5 above for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session;
- 7. *Further requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop recommendations for guidelines for the reviews pursuant to chapter V of the annex (Review), including in relation to the Article 6 technical expert review team, in a manner that minimizes the burden on Parties and the secretariat, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session that include:
 - (a) Provisions ensuring that the reviews assess consistency of the information provided on the cooperative approach with that in the annex;
 - (b) That reviews are desk reviews or centralized reviews (as per the descriptions in paras. 152 and 154 of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1) and are conducted at regular intervals each year;
 - (c) Development of modalities for reviewing information that is confidential;
 - (d) That the reviews ensure consistency between the reporting of all of the Parties participating in a cooperative approach, in respect of that cooperative approach;
 - (e) That the reviews specify recommended action to be taken when inconsistencies are identified, and provisions on how a Party should respond to those recommendations and the implications of non-responsiveness, if any;
 - (f) The composition of the Article 6 technical expert review team, how the team interacts with the participating Party when undertaking the review, the implications of paragraph 176, annex to decision 18/CMA.1 in respect of composition of Article 13 review teams, and the training programme for the Article 6 technical experts;
 - (g) Coordination of the Article 6 technical expert review with the technical expert review referred to in chapter VII of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, including ensuring that Article 6 technical expert reviews in a given review cycle are completed in advance of, and the relevant reports are provided to, the technical expert review referred to in chapter VII of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1;
- 8. *Invites* submissions from Parties on options for implementing the infrastructure requirements referred to in chapter VI of the annex (Recording and tracking), by 31 March 2022;

³ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

9. *Requests* the secretariat to organize a technical workshop, ensuring broad participation of Parties to develop options for implementing the infrastructure requirements, including guidance for registries, the international registry, the Article 6 database and the centralized accounting and reporting platform referred to in chapter VI of the annex (Recording and tracking) for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at its fifty-sixth session;
10. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, on the basis of the submissions referred to in paragraph 8 above and taking into account the options developed pursuant to paragraph 9 above to make recommendations relating to infrastructure, including guidance for registries, the international registry, the Article 6 database and the centralized accounting and reporting platform referred to in chapter VI of the annex (Recording and tracking) for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session;
11. *Affirms* that the guidance will not infringe on the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions;
12. *Requests* the secretariat to design and, following consultation with Parties, implement a capacity-building programme, including through its regional collaboration centres, to assist Parties, particularly developing country Parties, intending to participate in cooperative approaches including to:
- (a) Support the development of institutional arrangements, including in relation to reporting, in order to enable Parties to engage in cooperative approaches;
 - (b) Help Parties ensure that cooperative approaches in which they participate support ambition;
 - (c) Assist the least developed countries and small island developing States in meeting the participation requirements, as set out in chapter II of the annex (Participation);
13. *Also requests* the secretariat to prepare annually a compilation and synthesis of the results of the Article 6 technical expert review, including identification of recurring themes and lessons learned, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, including in the context of its review of the guidance;
14. *Decides* to review the guidance at its tenth session (2028) and to complete the review by no later than at its twelfth session (2030) in order to coordinate the timing of the review with that of the review undertaken in accordance with paragraph 18 of decision 4/CMA.1;
15. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to commence its work in 2028 to develop recommendations in relation to the review referred to in paragraph 14 above, and *decides* that the relevant work of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice shall include, but is not limited to:
- (a) Participation responsibilities in chapter II of the annex (Participation);
 - (b) Implementation of chapter III of the annex (Corresponding adjustments), including consideration of other methods in addition to those set out in chapter III.B of the annex (Application of corresponding adjustments) and elaboration of guidance to provide for a single method for corresponding adjustments, to be applied from 2031 onward;
 - (c) Implementation of chapter IV of the annex (Reporting);
 - (d) Implementation of chapter V of the annex (Review);
 - (e) Consideration of any need for safeguards and limits in addition to those already operationalized through the annex;
16. *Requests* the secretariat to support the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures (referred to in para. 33 of decision 1/CP.21) in considering ways to address negative social or economic impacts, especially on developing country Parties, resulting from activities under Article 6, paragraph 2, as requested by the forum;
17. *Invites* the Adaptation Fund to report in its annual reports to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on funding related to

participation in cooperative approaches pursuant to paragraph 36 of chapter VII of the annex (Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions);

18. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

19. *Requests* that the actions called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources;

20. *Invites* Parties to make contributions to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities for operationalizing the guidance and for supporting the workshops referred to in paragraphs 5 and 9 above, and the capacity-building programme referred to in paragraph 12 above.

Annex

Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement

I. Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes

1. Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) from a cooperative approach are:

(a) Real, verified, and additional;

(b) Emission reductions and removals, including mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans or the means to achieve them, when internationally transferred;

(c) Measured in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (t CO₂ eq) in accordance with the methodologies and metrics assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) or in other non-greenhouse gas (GHG) metrics determined by the participating Parties that are consistent with the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of the participating Parties;

(d) From a cooperative approach referred to in Article⁴ 6, paragraph 2, (hereinafter referred to as a cooperative approach) that involves the international transfer of mitigation outcomes authorized for use towards an NDC pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 3;

(e) Generated in respect of or representing mitigation from 2021 onward;

(f) Mitigation outcomes authorized by a participating Party for use for international mitigation purposes other than achievement of an NDC (hereinafter referred to as international mitigation purposes) or authorized for other purposes as determined by the first transferring participating Party (hereinafter referred to as other purposes) (international mitigation purposes and other purposes are hereinafter referred to together as other international mitigation purposes);

(g) Article 6, paragraph 4, emission reductions issued under the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, when they are authorized for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or authorized for use for other international mitigation purposes;

2. A “first transfer” is:

(a) For a mitigation outcome authorized by a participating Party for use towards the achievement of an NDC, the first international transfer of the mitigation outcome; or

(b) For a mitigation outcome authorized by a participating Party for use for other international mitigation purposes, (i) the authorization, or (ii) the issuance, or (iii) the use or cancellation of the mitigation outcome, as specified by the participating Party.

II. Participation

3. Each Party participating in a cooperative approach that involves the use of ITMOs (hereinafter referred as a participating Party) shall ensure that its participation in the

⁴ “Article” refers to an Article of the Paris Agreement, unless otherwise specified.

cooperative approach and the authorization, transfer and use of ITMOs is consistent with this guidance and relevant decisions of the CMA and that it applies this guidance to all corresponding adjustments and cooperative approaches in which it participates.

4. Each participating Party shall ensure that:
 - (a) It is a Party to the Paris Agreement;
 - (b) It has prepared, communicated and is maintaining an NDC in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2;
 - (c) It has arrangements in place for authorizing the use of ITMOs towards achievement of NDCs pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 3;
 - (d) It has arrangements in place that are consistent with this guidance and relevant decisions of the CMA, for tracking ITMOs;
 - (e) It has provided the most recent national inventory report required in accordance with decision 18/CMA.1;
 - (f) Its participation contributes to the implementation of its NDC and long-term low-emission development strategy, if it has submitted one, and the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.
5. In relation to the least developed countries and small island developing States, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 6, their special circumstances shall be recognized where this guidance relates to NDCs, and other aspects of their special circumstances may be recognized in further decisions of the CMA relating to this guidance.

II. Corresponding adjustments

A. Internationally transferred mitigation outcome metrics

6. For all ITMOs (ITMOs in a non-GHG metric determined by the participating Parties and ITMOs measured in t CO₂ eq), each participating Party shall apply corresponding adjustments, consistently with this guidance and relevant future decisions of the CMA.

B. Application of corresponding adjustments

7. Each participating Party shall apply corresponding adjustments in a manner that ensures transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency; that participation in cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions across participating Parties within and between NDC implementation periods; and that corresponding adjustments shall be representative and consistent with the participating Party's NDC implementation and achievement. Each participating Party shall apply one of the following methods consistently throughout the NDC period:

- (a) Where the participating Party has a single-year NDC:
 - (i) Providing an indicative multi-year emissions trajectory, trajectories or budget for the NDC implementation period that is consistent with implementation and achievement of the NDC, and annually applying corresponding adjustments for the total amount of ITMOs first transferred and used for each year in the NDC implementation period;
 - (ii) Calculating the average annual amount of ITMOs first transferred and used over the NDC implementation period, by taking the cumulative amount of ITMOs and

dividing by the number of elapsed years in the NDC implementation period and annually applying indicative corresponding adjustments equal to this average amount for each year in the NDC implementation period and applying corresponding adjustments equal to this average amount in the NDC year;

(b) Where the participating Party has a multi-year NDC, calculating a multi-year emissions trajectory, trajectories or budget for its NDC implementation period that is consistent with the NDC, and annually applying corresponding adjustments for the total amount of ITMOs first transferred and used each year in the NDC implementation period and cumulatively at the end of the NDC implementation period.

8. Each participating Party with an NDC measured in t CO₂ eq shall apply corresponding adjustments pursuant to paragraph 7 above, resulting in an emissions balance as referred to in decision 18/CMA.1, annex, paragraph 77(d)(ii) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, reported pursuant to paragraph 23 of this guidance, for each year, by applying corresponding adjustments in the following manner to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks from the sectors and GHGs covered by its NDC consistently with this chapter III and relevant future decisions of the CMA:

(a) Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred pursuant to paragraph 7 above;

(b) Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

9. Each participating Party with an NDC containing non-GHG metrics determined by the participating Parties engaging in a cooperative approach involving ITMOs traded in non-GHG metrics shall apply corresponding adjustments pursuant to paragraph 7 above, on the basis of ITMOs recorded in a metric-specific registry account, resulting in an annual adjusted indicator, reported pursuant to paragraph 23 of this guidance, by applying corresponding adjustments to the annual level of the relevant non-GHG indicator that was selected pursuant to paragraph 65 of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 and is being used by the Party to track progress towards the implementation and achievement of its NDC, consistently with this chapter and relevant future decisions of the CMA, in the following manner:

(a) Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred, pursuant to paragraph 7 above;

(b) Adding the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

10. Each participating Party with a first or first updated NDC consisting of policies and measures that are not quantified shall apply corresponding adjustments pursuant to paragraph 7 above, resulting in an emissions balance, as referred to in decision 18/CMA.1, reported pursuant to paragraph 21 below for each year, by applying corresponding adjustments in the following manner to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks for those emission or sink categories affected by the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities and by those policies and measures that include the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities, as applicable, consistently with this chapter and relevant future decisions of the CMA:

(a) Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, pursuant to paragraph 7 above;

- (a) Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above.

11. Where, in this annex, the terms sectors and GHGs apply in relation to an NDC, that provision shall be read as referring to sectors and GHGs, or categories in the case referred to in paragraph 10 above.

12. Additions and subtractions for an NDC implementation period shall be considered final, prior to the initiation of the review of the first biennial transparency report that contains information on the end year or end of the period of the NDC, by a date to be determined by the CMA.

13. A participating Party that first transfers ITMOs from emission reductions and removals covered by its NDC shall apply corresponding adjustments consistently with this guidance.

14. A participating Party that first transfers ITMOs from emission reductions and removals that are not covered by its NDC shall apply corresponding adjustments consistently with this guidance.

15. This chapter shall not require a participating Party to update its NDC.

C. Other international mitigation purposes

16. Where a participating Party authorizes the use of mitigation outcomes for other international mitigation purposes, it shall apply a corresponding adjustment, for the first transfer of such mitigation outcomes consistently with this guidance.

D. Safeguards and limits to the transfer and use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes

17. Each participating Party shall ensure that the use of cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions of participating Parties within and between NDC implementation periods or across participating Parties and shall ensure transparency, accuracy, consistency, completeness and comparability in tracking progress in implementation and achievement of its NDC by applying safeguards and limits set out in further guidance by the CMA.

III. Reporting

A. Initial report

18. Each participating Party shall submit an Article 6, paragraph 2, initial report (hereinafter referred to as an initial report) no later than authorization of ITMOs from a cooperative approach or where practical (in the view of the participating Party), in conjunction with the next biennial transparency report due pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1 for the period of NDC implementation. The initial report shall contain comprehensive information to:

(a) Demonstrate that the participating Party fulfils the participation responsibilities referred to in chapter II above (Participation);

(b) Provide, where the participating Party has not yet submitted a biennial transparency report, the information referred to in paragraph 64 of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1;

(c) Communicate the ITMO metrics and the method for applying corresponding adjustments as per chapter III.B above for multi- or single-year NDCs that will be applied consistently throughout the period of NDC implementation and where the method is a multi-year emissions trajectory, trajectories or budget, describe the method;

(d) Quantify the Party's mitigation information in its NDC in t CO₂ eq, including the sectors, sources, GHGs and time periods covered by the NDC, the reference level of emissions and removals for the relevant year or period, and the target level for its NDC; or where this is not possible, provide the methodology for the quantification of the NDC in t CO₂ eq;

(e) Quantify the NDC, or the portion in the relevant non-GHG indicator, in a non-GHG metric determined by each participating Party, if applicable;

(f) For a first or first updated NDC consisting of policies and measures that is not quantified, quantify the emission level resulting from the policies and measures that are relevant to the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities for the categories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks as identified by the host Party pursuant to paragraph 10 above, and the time periods covered by the NDC;

(g) Provide, for each cooperative approach, a copy of the authorization by the participating Party, a description of the approach, its duration, the expected mitigation for each year of its duration, and the participating Parties involved and authorized entities;

(h) Describe how each cooperative approach ensures environmental integrity, including:

(i) That there is no net increase in global emissions within and between NDC implementation periods;

(ii) Through robust, transparent governance and the quality of mitigation outcomes, including through conservative reference levels, baselines set in a conservative way and below 'business as usual' emission projections (including by taking into account all existing policies and addressing uncertainties in quantification and potential leakage);

(iii) By minimizing the risk of non-permanence of mitigation across several NDC periods and how, when reversals of emission reductions or removals occur, the cooperative approach will ensure that these are addressed in full;

(i) Describe how each cooperative approach will:

(i) Minimize and, where possible, avoid negative environmental, economic and social impacts;

(ii) Reflect the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement, acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity;

(iii) Be consistent with the sustainable development objectives of the Party, noting national prerogatives;

(iv) Apply any safeguards and limits set out in further guidance from the CMA pursuant to chapter III.E above (Safeguards and limits to the transfer and use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes);

- (v) Contribute resources for adaptation pursuant to chapter VII below (Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions), if applicable;
- (vi) Deliver overall mitigation in global emissions pursuant to chapter VII below (Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions), if applicable.

19. For each further cooperative approach, each participating Party shall submit the information referred to in paragraph 18 (g-i) above in an updated initial report and for inclusion in the centralized accounting and reporting platform referred to in chapter VI.C below (Centralized accounting and reporting platform) and include it in the next biennial transparency report due.

B. Annual information

20. Each participating Party shall, on an annual basis by no later than 15 April of the following year and in an agreed electronic format, submit for recording in the Article 6 database as referred to in chapter VI.B below (Article 6 database):

(a) Annual information on authorization of ITMOs for use towards achievement of NDCs, authorization of ITMOs for use towards other international mitigation purposes, first transfer, transfer, acquisition, holdings, cancellation, voluntary cancellation, voluntary cancellation of mitigation outcomes or ITMOs towards overall mitigation in global emissions, and use towards NDCs;

(b) In respect of the above, the cooperative approach, the other international mitigation purpose authorized by the Party, the first transferring participating Party, the using participating Party or authorized entity or entities, as soon as it is known, the year in which the mitigation occurred, the sector(s) and activity type(s), and the unique identifiers.

C. Regular information

21. Each participating Party shall include as an annex to its biennial transparency reports that are submitted in accordance with paragraph 10(b) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 and no later than 31 December of the relevant year, the following information in relation to its participation in cooperative approaches:

(a) How it is fulfilling the participation responsibilities referred to in chapter II above (Participation);

(b) Updates to the information provided in its initial report as per chapter IV.A above, and any previous biennial transparency reports for any information that is not included in the biennial transparency report pursuant to paragraph 64 of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1;

(c) Authorizations and information on its authorization(s) of use of ITMOs towards achievement of NDCs and authorization for use for other international mitigation purposes, including any changes to earlier authorizations, pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 3;

(d) How corresponding adjustments undertaken in the latest reporting period, pursuant to chapter III above (Corresponding adjustments), ensure that double counting is avoided in accordance with paragraph 36 of decision 1/CP.21 and are representative of progress towards implementation and achievement of its NDC, and how those corresponding adjustments ensure that participation in cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions across participating Parties within and between NDC implementation periods;

(e) How it has ensured that ITMOs that have been used towards achievement of its NDC or mitigation outcome(s) authorized for use and that have been used for other international mitigation purposes will not be further transferred, further cancelled or otherwise used.

22. Each participating Party shall also include, as an annex to its biennial transparency reports that are submitted in accordance with paragraph 10(b) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 and no later than 31 December of the relevant year, the following information on how each cooperative approach in which it participates:

- (a) Contributes to the mitigation of GHGs and the implementation of its NDC;
- (b) Ensures environmental integrity, including:
 - (i) That there is no net increase in global emissions within and between NDC implementation periods;
 - (ii) Through robust, transparent governance and the quality of mitigation outcomes, including through conservative reference levels, baselines set in a conservative way and below 'business as usual' emission projections (including by taking into account all existing policies and addressing uncertainties in quantification and potential leakage);
 - (iii) By minimizing the risk of non-permanence of mitigation across several NDC periods and when reversals of emission removals occur, ensuring that these are addressed in full;
- (c) Where a mitigation outcome is measured and transferred in t CO₂ eq, provides for the measurement of mitigation outcomes in accordance with the methodologies and metrics assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and adopted by the CMA;
- (d) Where a mitigation outcome is measured and first transferred in a non-GHG metric determined by the participating Parties, ensures that the method for converting the non-GHG metric into t CO₂ eq is appropriate for the specific non-GHG metric and the mitigation scenario in which it is applied, including how the conversion method:
 - (i) Represents the emission reductions or removals that occur within the geographical boundaries and time frame in which the non-GHG mitigation outcome was generated;
 - (ii) Is appropriate for the specific non-CO₂ eq metric, including a demonstration of how the selection of the conversion method and conversion factor(s) applied take into consideration the specific scenario in which the mitigation action occurs;
 - (iii) Is transparent, including a description of the method, the source of the underlying data, how the data are used, and how the method is applied in a conservative manner that addresses uncertainty and ensures environmental integrity;
- (e) Provides for, as applicable, the measurement of mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans;
- (f) Minimizes and where possible avoids negative, environmental, economic and social impacts;
- (g) Reflects the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement, acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations

and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity;

(h) Is consistent with and contributes to the sustainable development objectives of the Party, noting national prerogatives;

(i) Applies any safeguards and limits set out in further guidance from the CMA pursuant to chapter III.E above (Safeguards and limits to the transfer and use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes);

(j) Contributes resources for adaptation pursuant to chapter VII below (Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions), if applicable;

(k) Delivers overall mitigation in global emissions pursuant to chapter VII below (Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions), if applicable.

23. Each participating Party shall submit the following annual information (reported biennially) in a manner consistent with chapter III.B above (Application of corresponding adjustments) and any updates to information submitted for previous years in the NDC implementation period to the Article 6 database pursuant to chapter VI.B below (Article 6 database), and shall include it in the structured summary (required pursuant to paragraph 77(d) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, as part of the biennial transparency report):

(a) Annual anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by its NDC or, where applicable, for the emission or sink categories as identified by the host Party pursuant to paragraph 10 above (as part of the information referred to in para. 77 (d)(i) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1);

(b) Annual anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by its NDC or, where applicable, from the portion of its NDC in accordance with paragraph 10 above;

(c) Annual quantity of ITMOs first transferred;

(d) Annual quantity of mitigation outcomes authorized for use for other international mitigation purposes and entities authorized to use such mitigation outcomes, as appropriate;

(e) Annual quantity of ITMOs used towards achievement of its NDC;

(f) Net annual quantity of ITMOs resulting from paragraph 23 (c–e) above;

(g) Total quantitative corresponding adjustments used to calculate the emissions balance referred to in paragraph 23 (i–k) below, in accordance with the Party's method for applying corresponding adjustments consistent with chapter III.B above (Application of corresponding adjustments);

(h) The cumulative information in respect of the annual information in paragraph 23 (f) above, as applicable;

(i) The annual level of the relevant non-GHG indicator that is being used by the Party to track progress towards the implementation and achievement of its NDC and was selected pursuant to paragraph 65 of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1;

(j) For the information referred to in paragraph 23 (b) to (d) above, the amounts per the cooperative approach, sector, transferring Party, using Party and vintage of the ITMO for each cooperative approach (in the annex referred to in para. 22 above);

(k) For metrics in:

(i) Tonnes of CO₂ eq or non-GHGs, an annual emissions balance consistent with chapter III.B above (Application of corresponding adjustments) (as part of the information referred to in para. 77(d)(ii) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1);

(ii) Non-GHGs, for each non-GHG metric determined by participating Parties, annual adjustments resulting in an annual adjusted indicator, consistently with paragraph 9 in chapter III.B above (Application of corresponding adjustments) and future decisions of the CMA (as part of the information referred to in para. 77(d)(iii) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1);

(l) In biennial transparency reports that contain information on the end year of the NDC implementation period, in its assessment of whether it has achieved the target(s) for its NDC pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1, paragraphs 70 and 77, the application of the necessary corresponding adjustments consistently with chapter III above (Corresponding adjustments) and consistently with future decisions of the CMA.

24. Information submitted by a Party pursuant to this chapter that is not identified by that Party as confidential (non-confidential information) shall be made public on the centralized accounting and reporting platform.

IV. Review

25. An Article 6 technical expert review consists of a desk or centralized review of the consistency of the information submitted by the Party under chapter IV.A and C above (Reporting) with this guidance. An Article 6 technical expert review shall be undertaken in a manner that minimizes burden on Parties and the secretariat.

26. An Article 6 technical expert review team shall review the information submitted pursuant to chapter IV.A and C above (Reporting) in accordance with guidelines adopted by the CMA. To the extent possible, information submitted by all the participating Parties on a cooperative approach shall be reviewed as part of the review.

27. The Article 6 technical expert review team shall prepare a report on its review, pursuant to paragraph 24 above, that shall, if applicable, include recommendations to the participating Party on how to improve consistency with this guidance and relevant decisions of the CMA, including on how to address inconsistencies in quantified information that is reported under chapter IV.B–C above (Reporting) and/or identified by the secretariat as part of the consistency check.

28. The Article 6 technical expert review team shall forward its reports for consideration by the technical expert review referred to in chapter VII of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 in accordance with the guidelines referred to in paragraph 24 above and the reports shall be made publicly available on the centralized accounting and recording platform.

V. Recording and tracking

A. Tracking

29. Each participating Party shall have, or have access to, a registry for the purpose of tracking and shall ensure that such registry records, including through unique identifiers, as applicable: authorization, first transfer, transfer, acquisition, use towards NDCs, authorization for use towards other international mitigation purposes, and voluntary cancellation (including for overall mitigation in global emissions, if applicable), and shall have accounts as necessary.

30. The secretariat shall implement an international registry for participating Parties that do not have or do not have access to a registry. The international registry shall be able to perform the functions set out in paragraph 27 above. Any Party may request an account in the international registry.

31. The international registry shall be part of the centralized accounting and reporting platform referred to in chapter VI.C below (Centralized accounting and reporting platform).

B. Article 6 database

32. For transparency in relation to cooperative approaches, to record and compile the information submitted by participating Parties pursuant to chapter IV.B–C above (Reporting) and to support the review referred to in chapter V above (Review), the secretariat shall implement an Article 6 database as part of and integrated with the centralized accounting and reporting platform referred to in chapter VI.C below (Centralized accounting and reporting platform). The Article 6 database shall enable the following:

(a) Recording of corresponding adjustments and emissions balances and information on ITMOs first transferred, transferred, acquired, held, cancelled, cancelled for overall mitigation in global emissions, if any, and/or used by participating Parties, through identification of ITMOs by unique identifiers that identify, at the minimum, the participating Party, vintage of underlying mitigation, activity type and sector(s);

(b) Identifying inconsistencies to be notified to the participating Party or participating Parties, as applicable.

33. The secretariat shall:

(a) Check the consistency of information reported by a participating Party pursuant to chapter IV above (Reporting) for recording in the Article 6 database, with the requirements of this guidance and including across the participating Parties in a cooperative approach (consistency check);

(b) Notify the participating Party(ies) of any inconsistencies identified in the information reported by the Party, including compared with information reported by another participating Party;

(c) Provide information relevant to the participating Party's cooperative approach(es) (and other participating Parties, as relevant), including the consistency check to the Article 6 technical expert review team in accordance with the guidelines referred to in paragraph 26 above;

(d) Make non-confidential information in the consistency check publicly available on the centralized accounting and reporting platform.

34. Any amendments to the information recorded in the Article 6 database, including in response to any inconsistencies raised by the secretariat through the consistency check or as a result of recommendations arising from the Article 6 technical expert review pursuant to chapter V above (Review), shall be submitted by the participating Party to be recorded in the Article 6 database.

C. Centralized accounting and reporting platform

35. For transparency in relation to cooperative approaches and to support the review referred to in chapter V above (Review), the secretariat shall establish and maintain a

centralized accounting and reporting platform for publishing information submitted by participating Parties pursuant to chapter IV above (Reporting).

36. The secretariat shall:

(a) Maintain public information on cooperative approaches and ITMOs by extracting relevant non-confidential information from the information submitted by participating Parties pursuant to chapter IV above (Reporting);

(b) Maintain links to the publicly available information submitted by participating Parties on the cooperative approaches in which they participate;

(c) Provide an annual report to the CMA on the activities in relation to this chapter, including information on recorded ITMOs, corresponding adjustments and emission balances.

VI. Ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions

37. Participating Parties and stakeholders using cooperative approaches are strongly encouraged to commit to contribute resources for adaptation, in particular through contributions to the Adaptation Fund, and to take into account the delivery of resources under Article 6, paragraph 4, to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.

38. Each participating Party shall report as part of their reporting in accordance with chapter IV.C above (Regular information) on any contributions made pursuant to paragraph 37 above.

39. Participating Parties and stakeholders are strongly encouraged to cancel ITMOs that are not counted towards any Party's NDC or for other international mitigation purposes, to deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions, and to take into account the delivery of overall mitigation in global emissions under the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4.

40. Each participating Party shall report as part of their reporting in accordance with chapter IV.C above (Regular information) on any delivery of overall mitigation in global emissions related to its participation in cooperative approaches.

Related Events and Key Messages at COP 26

November 1, 2021

Meeting with Mr. Richard Graham, MP, Gloucester and UK Trade Envoy to the ASEAN Economic Community)

- The Secretary of Finance (SOF) met with Mr. Graham to discuss matters for collaboration for the COP 26 meeting as well as other issues of mutual concern.
- The SOF affirmed the Philippines' support to the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use, which President officially endorsed to UK Prime Minister on November 2, 2021. The endorsement formalizes the Philippines' commitment to reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030.
- The SOF and Mr. Graham also discussed the issue of green finance and the Philippines' initiatives to combat climate change during the meeting. The SOF cited the importance of the blended approach or the sustainable orchestration of grants, investments, and subsidies to make climate finance work for its beneficiaries.

Meeting with Mr. Jay Collins, Vice Chairman of Banking, Capital Markets. And Advisory of Citigroup)

- The SOF met with Mr. Collins to discuss how developing countries can maximize the capital flows in the international commercial markets for green financing.
- The SOF informed Mr. Collins that the Philippines is currently developing a sustainable finance framework for the issuance of our first-ever sovereign green bonds. As the Philippines is completing the framework for this landmark offering, the SOF welcomed Citi's assistance in reviewing it to ensure that it is on par with international standards.

November 2, 2021

TIME Panel Discussion

- The SOF participated in the panel discussion jointly hosted by TIME Magazine Singapore and the DOF. The SOF was joined by Mr. Masatsugu Asakawa, ADB President; Mr. Ahmed Saeed, ADB Vice President for East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific; and Mr. Jonathan Pershing, the US Deputy Special Envoy for Climate.
- President Asakawa opened the discussion by highlighting the ADB's ongoing efforts to back green development and financing mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, and accelerate the flow of funding support to its member economies for their climate mitigation and adaptation initiatives.
- The SOF discussed how the Philippines, as a developing economy and climate-vulnerable country, has been spearheading initiatives to broaden the participation of the financial sector in mobilizing funds and investments to squarely address the ill effects of the climate crisis.
- The SOF also pointed out that the Philippines is proceeding with its adaptation and mitigation programs on the ground, without waiting for the annual USD 100-billion climate financing pledge made by developed countries in 2020 to materialize, given that time is fast running out on current global efforts to fight climate change. The SOF, nonetheless, made it clear that the Philippines was maintaining its position that developed countries should get their act together to deliver on their financing commitment made 12 years ago, to assist climate-vulnerable countries in mitigating the disastrous effects of global warming.
- Mr. Saeed and Mr. Pershing gave their insights on green finance, how developing countries like the Philippines can make progress in meeting their GHG emissions targets amid the financial challenges they face in achieving these goals, and how multilateral institutions and countries like the US can assist these countries.
- The panel also briefly discussed the impact of rapid technological advances during the COVID-19 pandemic and how this highlight the need to build back better after the health crisis, by taking into account measures to fight

climate change; raising private sector capital for green financing; and the importance of climate-resilient infrastructure and technology transfers in executing adaptation and mitigation programs.

Meet and Greet with Filipino Graduate Students in Scotland

- The SOF met with 13 Filipino graduate students in Scotland to inspire them to work for the government and to discuss the Philippines' initiatives on the ground to address climate change. The SOF likewise called on the students to contribute their skills and ideas in the fight to combat the climate crisis, and motivate their fellow youth to take action in protecting the world's environment.
- The graduate students were taking up various courses in the fields of sustainable health care and environment, inclusive education, international economic law, urban climate, textile conservation, and political communication.

November 3, 2021

Launching of the Energy Transition Mechanism Project with the ADB and the Indonesian Government

- The ADB, the Philippines, and Indonesia launched the landmark Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) initiative that aims to accelerate the transition of countries in Southeast Asia from coal to green energy. The ETM is a public-private finance vehicle that aims to both reduce coal-fired power generation through accelerated plant retirement and boost the growth of RE using an equitable, scalable, and market-based approach.
- As presented by the ADB, the ETM partners will jointly conduct a thorough feasibility study, focusing on the optimal business model for each pilot country—the Philippines, Indonesia and, possibly, Vietnam—and bring together concessional resources from donor governments and philanthropies, in close coordination with global climate change-focused funds, to leverage large amounts of commercial capital to trigger a decisive shift towards de-carbonization.

- The ETM, envisioned to become the world's largest emission-mitigation program, will take into account power system reliability and affordability; robust measurement, reporting, and verification protocols to track GHG mitigation impacts; and the shift from coal to clean energy in a just and equitable manner for affected workers and communities.
- During the launching of the project, the SOF emphasized that the Philippines has a unique opportunity in Mindanao to pilot the ETM project as the government is in the process of rehabilitating the Agus-Pulangi hydropower plant to improve its generating capacity. As the Agus-Pulangi power plant complex composed of seven hydropower plants increases its generating capacity, the government can proceed with its plan to gradually acquire coal-fired power plants in Mindanao and repurpose them through the ETM facility.

Meeting with Mr. Rajiv Shah, President, Rockefeller Foundation

- The SOF met with Mr. Shah to briefly discuss a possible list of projects that the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP) can help fund for the Philippines. GEAPP is a new private sector-led global organization that has committed an initial USD 10 billion to help accelerate the implementation of clean energy projects in developing economies highly vulnerable to climate change. GEAPP is exploring a possible country partnership with the Philippines to assist in hastening the country's transition to green and renewable energy sources.

4th High-Level Ministerial Dialogue on Long Term Finance

- The Ministerial Dialogue was part of the series of high-level meetings hosted by the UK Presidency during the two-week run of COP26. The dialogue was composed of three panel discussions with the SOF participating in the second panel discussion. The SOF tackled the progress made by countries to develop a financial system to support a net-zero and climate-resilient future. Also participating in the Panel were Mr. Rishi Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer of the UK; Ms. Azucena Arbeleche, Minister of Economy and Finance of Uruguay; Ms. Alison Rose, Chief Executive of

NatWest Group; and Mr. Mathias Cormann, Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

- During the dialogue, the SOF underscored the importance of the blended approach or sustainable orchestration of grants, investments, and subsidies to make climate finance work for its beneficiaries. The SOF pointed out that because the funds involved come from taxpayers and investors, accountability and transparency should be ensured both on the part of the beneficiary and donor countries, to guarantee the prudent use of such climate finance aid.
- The SOF stressed during his intervention that the Philippines is firm in its position that those who have emitted and continue to emit the most GHG must bear the largest financial burden in the global transition to carbon neutrality.
- The SOF likewise emphasized that the support extended by multilateral institutions to the clean energy transition projects of developing economies, is crucial to encourage the flow of private sector capital into these initiatives.
- The SOF noted that the meticulous planning and vetting done by multilateral agencies before extending assistance to projects, will build confidence among private investors in mobilizing funds to participate in the resource-intensive programs of developing countries to transition to clean energy. Given their extensive monitoring and well-established vetting processes, the World Bank Group, the ADB, and the AIIB are in the best position to provide the seal of good housekeeping that would spur private sector investment in green projects.
- Thus, the SOF urged the multilateral banks to set up a harmonized set of guidelines to determine the viability and sustainability of climate projects. Under this proposal, the multilateral banks will also set the standards for transparency and accountability, and work together with other institutions around the world in ensuring that such standards and guidelines are adopted.

Meeting with Ms. Manuela Ferro, Vice President for East Asia and the Pacific, World Bank Group

- The SOF met with Ms. Ferro to discuss ways on how the World Bank can partner with the Philippines in addressing climate change.
- Ms. Ferro informed the SOF that the World Bank is scaling its investments to projects that will accelerate the transition of developing countries to clean energy. In response, the SOF emphasized the need for the World Bank to allocate a bigger portion of its portfolio to climate change projects and programs.
- In relation to this, the SOF underscored that climate finance should be a mix of grants for capacity building, investments for green projects, and most importantly, subsidies that should address the financial costs and risks of communities transitioning to a climate-resilient economy. As these funds are ultimately from taxpayers, accountability and transparency are paramount to ensure the prudent use of such funds.
- Further, the SOF said the Philippines is firm in its position that those who have emitted and continue to emit the most greenhouse gases must bear the largest financial burden in the transition to carbon neutrality. The Philippines, however, will not wait for the Western nations to get their act together. The country will move ahead with the implementation of actual projects on the ground to enable the country to meet its climate commitments.

November 4, 2021

COP26 Side Event

- In a forum with the theme “MDB Support for a Just Transition—From Common”, DOF Undersecretary Mark Dennis Joven proposed that governments and MDBs work closely together in addressing the transitional adjustments that might have to be undertaken by the concerned sectors, to ensure the seamless implementation of climate-related projects on the ground.

- The Undersecretary pointed out that while MDBs like the ADB have been actively supporting the Philippines' clean energy transition efforts, more work needs to be done in implementing the country's just transition principles.
- The Undersecretary cited as an example the ADB's support for a project that aims to replace gas-guzzling and inefficient public utility vehicles (PUVs), such as tricycles plying urban areas, with more energy-efficient electric-powered ones. This project had passed the ADB's environment, social, and gender safeguards, but critical support was deemed necessary to ensure its sustainability, such as the setting up of more and accessible charging terminals for the vehicles, and providing assistance to drivers shifting to the new transportation system.
- The Undersecretary also said additional studies should be done when putting in place innovations or new systems that support climate change-related initiatives, to determine whether these would already work under existing regulatory frameworks or would require new legislation to ensure their efficient implementation.
- The Undersecretary noted that the Philippines is a leader in the area of game-changing climate legislation as a result of the support extended by ADB and other multilateral institutions in the form of policy-based loans and technical assistance. As early as 2008, when its Renewable Energy Act was passed by Congress, the Philippines has been adopting just transition principles in the areas of climate change and fossil fuel reduction. These include the subsequent enactment of laws such as the Climate Change Act in 2009 and the Green Jobs Act of 2016.
- The Undersecretary also cited critical government policies like the Adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the recent submission of the Philippines' NDC; the International Labor Organization (ILO) application of Just Transition Guidelines in the Philippines in 2017; and the Issuance of Guidelines for Green Economy Models in 2017, as among the country's initiatives to put the issue of just transition front and center of climate change discussions.

November 9, 2021

Meeting with Ms. Milling, UK Minister of State for Asia

- Ms. Milling along with Mr. Ken O’Flaherty, COP Regional Ambassador for Asia, met with the SOF for a courtesy call.
- The SOF expressed his disappointment to COP26 having observed it to be an ineffective platform to address climate change issues, citing that COP26 is already the 26th annual meeting, yet little concrete action has been achieved. The SOF also emphasized the three elements of climate finance to get actual projects moving on the ground.
- As the host of this year’s COP, the SOF broached a proposal for the UK Government to take a closer look at practical approaches to mobilize climate finance. The UK must encourage MDBs to catalyze financial flows to developing countries in order to meet global climate change objectives.
- The SOF underscored the Philippines’ strong resolve of moving ahead with the implementation of actual projects on the ground to enable the country to meet its climate commitments rather than wait for Western countries’ contributions to materialize.



02.11.2021

GLASGOW LEADERS' DECLARATION ON FORESTS AND LAND USE

We, the leaders of the countries identified below:

Emphasise the critical and interdependent roles of forests of all types, biodiversity and sustainable land use in enabling the world to meet its sustainable development goals; to help achieve a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and removal by sinks; to adapt to climate change; and to maintain other ecosystem services.

Reaffirm our respective commitments, collective and individual, to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, the Sustainable Development Goals; and other relevant initiatives.

Reaffirm our respective commitments to sustainable land use, and to the conservation, protection, sustainable management and restoration of forests, and other terrestrial ecosystems.

Recognise that to meet our land use, climate, biodiversity and sustainable development goals, both globally and nationally, will require transformative further action in the interconnected areas of sustainable production and consumption; infrastructure development; trade; finance and investment; and support for smallholders, Indigenous Peoples, and local

communities, who depend on forests for their livelihoods and have a key role in their stewardship.

Highlight the areas of strong progress in recent years and the opportunities before us to accelerate action.

We therefore commit to working collectively to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030 while delivering sustainable development and promoting an inclusive rural transformation.

We will strengthen our shared efforts to:

1. Conserve forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerate their restoration;
2. Facilitate trade and development policies, internationally and domestically, that promote sustainable development, and sustainable commodity production and consumption, that work to countries' mutual benefit, and that do not drive deforestation and land degradation;
3. Reduce vulnerability, build resilience and enhance rural livelihoods, including through empowering communities, the development of profitable, sustainable agriculture, and recognition of the multiple values of forests, while recognising the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as local communities, in accordance with relevant national legislation and international instruments, as appropriate;
4. Implement and, if necessary, redesign agricultural policies and programmes to incentivise sustainable agriculture, promote food security, and benefit the environment;
5. Reaffirm international financial commitments and significantly increase finance and investment from a wide variety of public and private sources, while also improving its effectiveness and accessibility, to enable sustainable agriculture, sustainable forest management, forest conservation and restoration, and support for Indigenous Peoples and local communities;
6. Facilitate the alignment of financial flows with international goals to reverse forest loss and degradation, while ensuring robust policies and systems are in place to accelerate the transition to an economy that is resilient and advances forest, sustainable land use, biodiversity and climate goals.

We urge all leaders to join forces in a sustainable land use transition. This is essential to meeting the Paris Agreement goals, including reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C, noting that the science shows further acceleration of efforts is needed if we are to collectively keep 1.5°C within reach. Together we can succeed in fighting climate change, delivering resilient and inclusive growth, and halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation.

NEW ENDORSEMENTS SINCE 10/11/21: The Holy See, Nicaragua, Singapore, Turkmenistan

% OF FOREST COVERED BY ENDORSERS: 90.94%

HECTARES OF FOREST COVERED BY ENDORSERS: 3,691,510,640

SQUARE MILES OF FOREST COVERED BY ENDORSERS: 14,252,996

Total: 141

1. Albania
2. Andorra
3. Angola
4. Argentina
5. Armenia
6. Australia
7. Austria
8. Azerbaijan
9. Bangladesh
10. Belgium
11. Belize
12. Bhutan
13. Bosnia and Herzegovina
14. Botswana
15. Brazil
16. Brunei Darussalam
17. Bulgaria

18. Burkina Faso
19. Cameroon
20. Canada
21. Central African Republic
22. Chad
23. Chile
24. China
25. Colombia
26. Costa Rica
27. Côte d'Ivoire
28. Croatia
29. Cuba
30. Cyprus
31. Czechia
32. Denmark
33. Dominican Republic
34. Democratic Republic of the Congo
35. Ecuador
36. El Salvador
37. Equatorial Guinea
38. Estonia
39. Eswatini
40. European Commission on behalf of the European Union
41. Fiji
42. Finland
43. France
44. Gabon
45. Georgia
46. Germany
47. Ghana
48. Greece
49. Grenada
50. Guatemala
51. Guinea Bissau
52. Guyana
53. Haiti
54. Holy See
55. Honduras
56. Hungary
57. Iceland
58. Indonesia
59. Ireland
60. Israel
61. Italy
62. Jamaica
63. Japan
64. Kazakhstan
65. Kenya
66. Kyrgyzstan
67. Latvia
68. Lebanon
69. Liberia
70. Liechtenstein
71. Lithuania
72. Luxembourg
73. Madagascar
74. Malawi
75. Malaysia

76. Mali
77. Malta
78. Mauritius
79. Mexico
80. Moldova
81. Monaco
82. Mongolia
83. Montenegro
84. Morocco
85. Mozambique
86. Nepal
87. Netherlands
88. New Zealand
89. Nicaragua
90. Niger
91. Nigeria
92. North Macedonia
93. Norway
94. Pakistan
95. Panama
96. Papua New Guinea
97. Paraguay
98. Peru
99. Philippines
100. Poland
101. Portugal
102. Republic of the Congo
103. Romania
104. Russia
105. Rwanda
106. Saint Lucia
107. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
108. Samoa
109. San Marino
110. Sao Tome and Principe
111. Senegal
112. Serbia
113. Seychelles
114. Sierra Leone
115. Singapore
116. Slovakia
117. Slovenia
118. Somalia
119. South Korea
120. Spain
121. Sri Lanka
122. Suriname
123. Sweden
124. Switzerland
125. Syria
126. Tanzania
127. Togo
128. Tonga
129. Turkey
130. Turkmenistan
131. Uganda
132. Ukraine
133. United Arab Emirates

- 134. United Kingdom
- 135. United States of America
- 136. Uruguay
- 137. Uzbekistan
- 138. Vanuatu
- 139. Vietnam
- 140. Zambia
- 141. Zimbabwe

12th November 2021 (6pm)

PRIVACY

COOKIE POLICY

TERMS & CONDITIONS

ACCESSIBILITY

CONTACT



UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE UK 2021

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH ITALY

04.11.2021

GLOBAL COAL TO CLEAN POWER TRANSITION STATEMENT

We, the undersigned, noting that coal power generation is the single biggest cause of global temperature increases, recognise the imperative to urgently scale-up the deployment of clean power to accelerate the energy transition.

We commit to work together to make clean power the most affordable and accessible option globally, with ensuing economic and health benefits as we build back better from the COVID pandemic.

Our shared vision is to accelerate a transition away from unabated coal power generation, as is essential to meet our shared goals under the Paris Agreement, in a way that benefits workers and communities and ensures access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030 (SDG7).

Unabated' coal power generation is described by the G7 and the IEA as referring to the use of coal power that is not mitigated with technologies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, such as Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (CCUS). You can find out more in this [G7 press release](#) (July 2021) and on page 193 of the [IEA 'Net Zero by 2050' report](#).

We commit to the following actions to drive this global transition forward, and we encourage others to make similar commitments:

1. To rapidly scale up our deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures in our economies, and to support other countries to do the same, recognising the leadership shown by countries making ambitious commitments, including through support from the Energy Transition Council;
2. To rapidly scale up technologies and policies in this decade to achieve a transition away from unabated coal power generation in the 2030s (or as soon as possible thereafter) for major economies and in the 2040s (or as soon as possible thereafter) globally, consistent with our climate targets and the Paris Agreement, recognising the leadership shown by countries making ambitious commitments, including through the Powering Past Coal Alliance;
3. To cease issuance of new permits for new unabated coal-fired power generation projects (New' coal-fired power generation projects are defined as coal-fired power generation projects that have not yet reached financial close), cease new construction of unabated coal-fired power generation projects and to end new direct government support for unabated international coal-fired power generation, recognising the leadership of countries making ambitious commitments, including through the No New Coal Power Compact;
4. To strengthen our domestic and international efforts to provide a robust framework of financial, technical, and social support to affected workers, sectors and communities to make a just and inclusive transition away from unabated coal power in a way that benefits them, and expands access to clean energy for all, recognising the leadership of countries endorsing the COP26 Just Transition Declaration.

We recognize that countries, workers, and communities in the developing world require support to transition from coal and realise a sustainable and economically inclusive energy future, and that international co-operation will be needed to provide such support.

We recognise that while significant progress has been made to realise our shared vision, our task is not yet complete, and we call on others to join us as we redouble our efforts to accelerate the global energy transition over the coming years.

Statement supported by:

The Republic of Albania, H.E. Ms. Belinda Balluku, Minister of Energy and Infrastructure

The Republic of Azerbaijan, HE Mr Parviz Shahbazov, Minister of Energy

The Kingdom of Belgium, Minister Zakia Khattabi, Minister for Climate, Environment, Sustainable Development and Green Deal

The Republic of Botswana, endorsing clauses 1, 2 and 4

Brunei Darussalam, Hon. Dato Seri Setia Ir. Awang Haji Suhaimi bin Haji Gafar, Minister of Development

Canada, Minister Steven Guilbeault

The Republic of Chile, Minister Juan Carlos Jobet

The Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Minister Thomas Camara

The Republic of Croatia, Mr Tomislav Čorić

The Republic of Cyprus, Environment Minister Mr. Costas Kadis

The Kingdom of Denmark, Minister Dan Jørgensen

The Republic of Ecuador, Minister Juan Carlos Bermeo, Minister of Energy and Non Renewable Resources

The Arab Republic of Egypt

The European Union, Commissioner Kadri Simson

The Republic of Finland, Minister Mika Lintilä

The French Republic, Minister Barbara Pompili

The Federal Republic of Germany, Minister Svenja Schulze

Hungary, Minister Attila Steiner, endorsing clauses 1, 2 and 4

The Republic of Indonesia, Minister Arifin, endorsing clauses 1, 2 and 4. Indonesia signs up to the COP26 Coal to Clean Power Transition statement, excluding clause 3 but as part of its commitment to reach net zero by 2060, or sooner with international assistance, Indonesia will consider accelerating coal phase out into the 2040s, conditional on agreeing additional international financial and technical assistance.

Ireland, Minister Eamon Ryan TD

The State of Israel, Minister Ms. Karine Elharrar and Minister Tamar Zandberg

The Italian Republic, Ecological Transition Minister, Roberto Cingolani

The Republic of Kazakhstan, First Vice-Minister of Energy, Murat Zhurebekov, endorsing clause 4

The Principality of Liechtenstein, H.E. Ms. Sabine Monauni

The Republic of Maldives, Minister Aminath Shauna

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mariam Bekaye

The Islamic Republic of Mauritius, Honourable Minister Kavydass Ramano

The Kingdom of Morocco, Minister Benali, endorsing clauses 1, 3 and 4

The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, Minister Ramashay Prasad Yadav

The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Minister Tom de Bruijn

New Zealand, Minister James Shaw

Republic of North Macedonia, Minister Naser Nuredini

The Republic of Philippines, Secretary Cusi, endorsing clause 1 and partially clauses 2 and 4. The Philippines would like to reiterate a call for climate justice given the Philippines is not a major emitter of greenhouse gases but bears the worsening impacts of climate change, and to emphasise that energy security is foremost as energy transition is a means to improve the lives of the Philippines' people and the country's economic development.

The Republic of Poland, Minister Anna Moskwa, Minister of Climate and Environment

The Portuguese Republic, Minister João Pedro Matos Fernandes

The Republic of Senegal, Minister Gladima

The Republic of Singapore, Minister Grace Fu

The Slovak Republic, Environment Minister Ján Budaj

Federal Republic of Somalia, Hon Amb Gamal Mohamed Hassan, Minister of Planning, Investment and Economic Development

The Republic of Korea, H.E. Moon Sung-wook, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy

The Kingdom of Spain, Minister Teresa Ribera

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Minister of Power Gamini Lokuge

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, COP26 President Alok Sharma

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Minister Nguyen Hong Dien

Wales, Julie James, Minister for Climate Change

The Republic of Zambia, Minister Hon. Collins Nzovu MP, Minister of Green Economy and Environment

Subnationals

Jeju, Special Self-Governing Province, Republic of Korea, Koo Man-Seop, Acting Governor

Negros Oriental, the Philippines, Governor Degamo

The State of Hawaii, USA, Governor Ige

The State of Oregon, USA, Governor Brown

The Australian Capital Territory Act Government, Australia, Minister Shane Rattenbury MLA

Organisations

ACWA Power, Paddy Padmanathan, President & CEO

Carbon Tracker, Jon Grayson, CEO

Diageo, Kirstie McIntyre, Director

Drax, Will Gardiner, CEO

EDF Group, Alexandre Perra, Group Senior Executive Vice-President

EDF UK, Simone Rossi, CEO

EDP, Miguel Stilwell de Andrade, CEO

Engie, Catherine MacGregor, CEO

Envision, Lei Zhang, CEO

Global Solar Council, Gianni Chianetta, CEO

GWEC, Ben Backwell, CEO

Iberdrola, Ignacio S Galan, CEO

International Geothermal Association, Marit Brommer, Executive Director

Legal & General Group Plc, Simon Gadd (ESG Director), John Godfrey (Public Affairs Director), Sara Heald (Head of CSR)

Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) , Cllr Doug McMurdo, LAPFF chair

Mott MacDonald, Professor Denise Bower, Executive Director

National Grid, John Pettigrew, CEO

Ørsted, Mads Nipper, CEO

PensionDanmark

PSEG, Ralph Izzo, CEO

Renew Power, Sumant Sinha

RES, Eduardo Medina, CEO

Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, Andreas Nauen, CEO

SSE, Alistair Philips-Davies, CEO

UKSIF, James Alexander, Chief Executive

Varma, Hanna Kaskela

PRIVACY

COOKIE POLICY

TERMS & CONDITIONS

ACCESSIBILITY

CONTACT

DHAKA-GLASGOW DECLARATION OF THE CVF**ANNEX 12****DHAKA-GLASGOW DECLARATION OF THE CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM**

Adopted

2 November 2021

We, Heads of State and Government, and high representatives, of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Pacific, and forming a significant number, and a representative group, of those countries most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, meeting in-person and virtually, as convened from Dhaka, and in Glasgow during the World Leaders Summit of UNFCCC COP26, in October and November 2021,

Alarmed at the recent findings of the IPCC's Sixth Assessment report (AR6) which confirmed that the warming of the climate system is accelerating with the world on track to reach 1.5°C as early as 2030, with certain adverse impacts of climate change, such as extreme heat spells, set to nearly double in scale by then compared to impacts at 1°C, as society now finds itself firmly within an escalating climate emergency,

Further alarmed at the conclusions of the UNFCCC Secretariat's 2021 reports on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, wherein a large number of parties to the Agreement, including a number of major emitting countries, failed to comply with the Agreement by updating or renewing enhanced NDCs, and whereby a major shortfall in contributions to limiting warming to 1.5°C prevails, though highlighting that the 1.5°C goal can still be kept alive if 2030 emissions are 45% below their 2010 levels, which requires drastic, constant and urgent ambition raising especially of major emitting countries prior to 2030,

All the more alarmed by reports of the unmet UNFCCC collective climate finance commitment of the developed countries to mobilize \$100 billion in annual, additional climate finance, with balanced funding for adaptation and mitigation, from 2020, and the threat that this default poses for confidence in the Paris climate regime in addition to weakening support for climate action by developing countries and our member states,

Recalling the urgent need for the transfer of green and clean technologies from developed to developing countries in order to effectively respond to climate change and resource priorities to implement climate change objectives and

socio-economic development for a post-COVID-19 recovery,

Recalling and reaffirming our commitments, as outlined in our previous declarations, notably our 2018 Virtual Summit Leaders' Communique, the Climate Vulnerables' Finance Summit Communique, and the CVF Vision, in addition to the Climate Vulnerables' Manifesto for COP26, adopted by the founding members of the CVF Climate Survival Leadership Group for COP26 in September 2021,

Recalling that, although we are not historically responsible for climate change, it is important the international community, and especially major carbon emitting countries, respond to the needs of the developing countries most vulnerable to climate change, members of the CVF, and appreciate that we are part of the solution: We have consistently demonstrated that within our countries can be found the answers and opportunities to the global climate problem,

Emboldened by progress in the implementation of this Manifesto through the holding in-person of COP26 as the most important meeting for the future of the planet, in addition to the establishment of a new Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change at the 48th session of the UN Human Rights Council, and the establishment of an IUCN Climate Crisis Commission at the September 2021 World Conservation Congress at Marseille, in a clear signal from the international community that the impact of climate change is both a human rights and an ecological crisis that we must respond to, including by leveraging and creating synergies between climate change and biological diversity,

Building on the outcome ministerial communiqués of four of our Forum's regional dialogues in which 56 nations participated with thanks to Bangladesh in its role as Forum chair, and to Costa Rica, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Philippines, as co-hosts of these dialogues,

Charged the international community to respond proportionately to the unprecedented global injustice of the climate crisis, which now imminently threatens the safety and in cases the viability or very existence of a number of our most vulnerable and least responsible nations, through redoubled efforts during this decade to keep the 1.5°C limit on warming within reach, deliver and work to upscale and improve promised climate finance, to accelerate adaptation, to promote gender-based and socially inclusive action, and to ensure the necessary life- and livelihood- preserving support for loss and damage of the most vulnerable,

Moved unitedly, compelled to act in the interests of our very survival, for younger and future generations, and for the preservation of Mother Earth^[1]:

OUR KEY PRIORITIES FOR COP26

We urged UNFCCC COP26 in Glasgow to:

1. Climate Emergency Pact

Deliver a "Climate Emergency Pact" to rebuild confidence in international climate cooperation, accelerate adaptation and to keep 1.5°C within reach, including:

2020-24 Climate Finance Delivery Plan

A Delivery Plan for the annual \$100 billion in climate finance from developed countries over the period 2020-2024 totaling \$500 billion in additional finance to Official Development Assistance commitments in support of climate action by developing countries inclusive through Paris Agreement NDCs and National Adaptation Plans and Communications with a 50:50 split of funds between adaptation and mitigation, and independent annual monitoring of implementation involving the IMF. We, furthermore, call on the COP26 Presidency of the United Kingdom to take full responsibility for the development of the Delivery Plan so vital to re-establishing confidence in the Paris Agreement and for supporting urgent climate action by developing nations.

Annual 2030 Ambition Raising Platforms

Annual 2030 Ambition Raising platforms mandated for every single COP yearly until 2025, where all governments but especially the major emitting countries are urged to come forward with new ambition on adaptation and mitigation, over and above their current NDCs, and through further development of National Adaptation Plans and Communications and full implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions of the Paris Agreement. Out of time, the world's governments and especially the major emitters have no choice but to work year-in year-out to constantly raise ambition to accelerate adaptation to keep people safe and 1.5°C within reach. Transparency can also be improved through universal, best-practice use of common tabular formats and capacity building on monitoring, reporting and verification systems, while streamlined reporting of additional commitments under annual ambition platforms could facilitate the ambition-raising process.

In addition, we outlined further key priorities for COP26, as follows:

2. Loss & Damage

COP26 must achieve substantial progress on loss and damage including by operationalizing the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage in addition to executing existing commitments to the Warsaw International Mechanism, and mandating work for financing options to increase the level of support to developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and most vulnerable communities, in order to avert, minimize and address the loss and damage that otherwise destroys lives, livelihoods, and communities on the frontlines of this global crisis. COP26 needs to place a higher level of prioritization on loss and damage, and we call for loss and damage to be devoted the necessary discussion space as part of the COP/CMA agenda as a standing item.

3. Robust Carbon Markets

Finalized, robust carbon market mechanisms consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and providing at least 5% of proceeds for financing to supplement other available funding in support of the urgent adaptation needs of the most vulnerable nations.

4. Accelerating Adaptation

The full substantiation and operationalization of the Paris Agreement Global Goal on Adaptation to be supported by increased financing for adaptation in addition to other enhanced means of implementation including technology transfer and development and capacity building. Development partners should ensure that adaptation initiatives become part and parcel of resilience development. Bold efforts to accelerate adaptation drawing on the template of major initiatives such as the Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program are urgently needed in every region, including to support locally-led community action and to empower the most vulnerable communities.

5. New & Improved Climate Finance

Beyond a Delivery Plan for the \$100 billion of annual balanced climate finance, climate finance effectiveness has far to go. Access to climate finance should be streamlined and facilitated particularly for vulnerable developing countries. The so far weakly capitalized key UNFCCC financing mechanisms of the Adaptation Fund, Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) must be significantly strengthened in future. Adaptation funds must reach the most vulnerable nations and communities with formal decision making within the GEF, GCF and regional and international multilateral development banks integrating vulnerability criteria. Amid a worsening debt crisis compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate finance must also reverse the otherwise increasing share of climate finance as loans, and a decreasing share of grants, helping to lessen and not worsen our debt burden, and free up the necessary fiscal space for ambitious climate action. We, furthermore, urged the launch of an Emergency Coalition for Climate Resilient Debt Restructuring to harness debt servicing payments to ensure existing infrastructure of fiscally constrained vulnerable nations is rendered climate resilient and consistent with a rapid transition to 100% renewable energy, avoiding financial losses for all concerned.

6. Shifting Trillions

Vulnerable developing countries need trillions not billions of dollars of investment to underpin and secure a climate resilient and zero carbon future. Urgent work and progress is therefore needed to conclude a new annual climate finance goal of developed countries from a floor of \$100 billion from 2025 that takes account of the greater ambition

demanded of all countries in both mitigation and adaptation, as well as ensuring more comprehensive financial support given the growing scope of climate effects such as for the World Ocean.

FURTHER CLIMATE MEASURES

Climate action must happen beyond the UNFCCC to complement it and the Paris Agreement's primary responsibility for arresting dangerous climate change, in which respect we particularly supported the following further key actions:

7. Maritime Emissions: We recognize the critical importance of shipping to our states and to prioritize and support all efforts to advocate for this sector. We call upon further urgent discussion, study and work of the IMO for establishing a mandatory GHG levy on international shipping to ensure that IMO emission measures are fully aligned with a 1.5°C pathway following IPCC AR6. We recognize the need for the shipping transition to next generation vessels and fuels to be equitable and benefit all states. We support that the majority of the levy's revenues be employed as additional financial support for urgent climate actions, particularly by the vulnerable developing countries. We urge members to consider adopting ambitious targets in domestic maritime emissions for a transition to zero emissions that leaves no one behind.

8. Maritime Zones: We call on all States to support the principles outlined in the Pacific Islands Forum 2021 Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the face of Climate Change-related Sea-level rise, in a plea to authorities at all levels to support the protection and preservation of maritime zones from the threats of climate change. The Declaration preserves maritime zones in the face of their erosion due to the detrimental effects of climate change-driven sea-level rise on territorial integrity, while upholding the centrality of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

9. Oceans and Seas: We reaffirm the importance of sustainable management, use and conservation of the World Ocean and call upon the UNFCCC and COP26 to establish a mandated process to incorporate oceans into the UNFCCC agenda and for increased investment for the establishment of observation systems, to understand impacts of climate change on the Ocean, blue carbon protection and restoration initiatives for climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as monitoring and prediction to strengthen natural disaster response and risk reduction strategies particularly for small islands.

10. Renewable Energy Transition: We call on all donors and multilateral and regional financing institutions, and the private sector, to support a rapid acceleration of the transition away from coal aided by adequate financing for comparable renewable energy capacity. This redoubling of efforts to finance renewable energy would support the call of the United Nations Secretary-General for an end to the international financing of coal.

11. Displacement and Migration: Urgently scaled up capacity, finance, technology and other support to reduce disaster displacement and ensure greater support for adaptation and to safeguard and promote local jobs and livelihoods to limit the adverse impact of climate change as a driver of migration. Where displacement and migration driven by climate change is unavoidable, we call on international support to assist and protect the growing number of climate displaced persons and migrants.

12. Workers and Jobs: Further scaled up capacity, finance, technology and other support to greatly enhance the protection of workers in regions most exposed to dangerous levels of extreme heat, rapid and slow onset disasters, and other impacts caused by climate change. We also call for a prioritization of support for reskilling and up-skilling of workers and social safety net support to enable a just transition and promote green jobs, particularly through women's and youth empowerment, as we pursue low-carbon and carbon neutral development under the Paris Agreement.

FORUM BUSINESS

We further elaborated our own program of activities with the following steps:

Climate Prosperity Plans

1. Following the adoption by Bangladesh of its “Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan”, named in honour of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, we recognized the interest of the following countries to develop their own national Climate Prosperity Plans in order to chart and implement strategic investment pathways to deliver robust socio-economic development by fully implementing with maximum ambition regarding climate adaptation and mitigation efforts, in accelerated promotion of prosperity:

Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Kiribati, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palau, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tunisia, Uganda and Vanuatu.

We likewise called upon the international community, and on technical agencies, donors and the private sector, to collaborate actively in the development and realization of CVF members' Climate Prosperity Plans, and the mobilization of the necessary financing for their delivery, while emphasizing the collective economic cooperation opportunity of successfully implementing these plans.

Membership

2. We confirmed the following nations as incoming members of our Forum: [list from secretariat – to be read out by Bangladesh].

Forum Offices

3. We confirmed in Ghana the next presidency of this Forum for the 2022-24 period.
4. We expressed sincere appreciation for the leadership of Bangladesh as president of the CVF and to H.E. Sheikh Hasina, Honorable Prime Minister of Bangladesh, the CVF Chair, in addition to the work of Ethiopia and the Marshall Islands in the CVF Troika.
5. We reaffirmed the role of the Global Center on Adaptation, named in November 2018 as Managing Partner of support to the CVF and V20, and host of the CVF and V20 secretariat, and expressed thanks to the secretariat team for their support to the Forum.
6. We also welcomed and express thanks for all the work of the five CVF Thematic Ambassadors for Ambition (Mohamed Nasheed), Culture (Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner), Parliaments (Loren Legarda), Renewable Energy (Tosi Mpanu Mpanu), and Vulnerability (Saima Wazed) to advance the causes and initiatives of the CVF.
7. We welcomed the establishment of the CVF Global Parliamentary Group on 26 October 2021 and encouraged the active engagement of the parliamentarians of all CVF members in the CVF Global Parliamentary Group in order to benefit from the exchange of legislative good practices and to enhance international engagement and cooperation on climate action with the legislative bodies of major economies.

Publications

8. Giving consideration to the Framework Report for a third 'Climate Vulnerability Monitor', we commissioned this important project of assessment into the global impact of climate change.
9. We likewise encouraged further iterations of the CVF's 'Low Carbon Monitor' project.

Resourcing

10. We encouraged interested donors and members to consider strengthening the CVF & V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund which finances the activities and priorities of the Forum through direct and indirect financial contributions.

Next Meeting

11. We agreed to reconvene at Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2022, in order to conclude an implementation plan for the present Declaration.

Developed at Dhaka on 19 October 2021 and adopted at Glasgow on 2 November 2021

^[1] As a common expression in a number of countries and regions.

Member states of the CVF:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, the Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, Saint Lucia, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen.

* * *

Advance unedited version

Decision -/CP.26

Long-term climate finance

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

Also recalling decisions 1/CP.16, paragraphs 2, 4 and 97–101, 1/CP.17, 2/CP.17, paragraphs 126–132, 4/CP.18, 3/CP.19, 5/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 5/CP.21, 7/CP.22, 6/CP.23, 3/CP.24, 11/CP.25, paragraph 10, and 5/CMA.2, paragraph 10,

1. *Recalls* the commitment of developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing country Parties in accordance with decision 1/CP.16;
2. *Welcomes* the recent pledges made to the Adaptation Fund (totalling USD 351.6 million) and to the Least Developed Countries Fund (totalling USD 605.3 million);
3. *Notes* the continued efforts of developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation, in accordance with decision 1/CP.16;
4. *Notes with serious concern* the gap in relation to the fulfilment of the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, including due to challenges in mobilizing finance from private sources;
5. *Notes* that a substantial component of climate finance from developed country Parties to developing country Parties is provided through public finance and *urges* developed country Parties to continue to scale up climate finance towards achieving the goal to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020;
6. *Acknowledges* the need to support developing country Parties in implementing the Convention;
7. *Recalls* that, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53, developed countries reaffirm the continuation of their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation;
8. *Notes with appreciation* the first report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement¹ and the fourth (2020) Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows;²
9. *Notes* recent pledges to increase climate finance, *acknowledges* that some developed country Parties have already doubled their provision of adaptation finance and *requests* other developed country Parties to significantly increase their provision of adaptation finance, including by, as appropriate, considering doubling adaptation finance with the aim of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation;
10. *Welcomes* the progress of Parties' efforts to strengthen their domestic enabling environments in order to attract climate finance and *requests* Parties to continue to enhance

¹ See document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2.

² See document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1.

their enabling environments and policy frameworks to facilitate the mobilization and effective deployment of climate finance in accordance with decision 3/CP.19;³

11. *Emphasizes* the importance of an effective and coherent climate finance landscape in maximizing access to climate finance in meeting the needs and priorities of developing country Parties;

12. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to continue its work on definitions of climate finance, taking into account the submissions received from Parties on this matter, with a view to providing input for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session (November 2022);

13. *Also requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to undertake further work on mapping the available information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including its reference to Article 9 thereof, with a view to providing input for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session;

14. *Notes* the biennial submissions received to date from developed country Parties on updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020 in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 10, and *takes note* of the compilation and synthesis thereof;⁴

15. *Notes* the summary reports on the 2019⁵ and 2020⁶ in-session workshops on long-term climate finance, in particular discussions on progress in mobilizing and scaling up climate finance held by the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-sixth session, and *invites* Parties and relevant institutions to consider the key messages contained therein;

16. *Notes with appreciation* the note by the Presidency of the twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties on the third biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance,⁷ particularly the key messages contained therein;

17. *Welcomes* the deliberations at the fourth high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance and *looks forward* to the summary to be prepared by the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties;

18. *Decides* that continued discussions on long-term climate finance will conclude in 2027;

19. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare a report in 2022 on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, taking into account the Climate Finance Delivery Plan⁸ and other relevant reports, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session, and to continue to contribute to assessing the achievement of the goal in the context of the preparation of its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows;

20. *Decides* to convene biennial high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in 2022, 2024 and 2026 and *requests* the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties to summarize the deliberations at the dialogues for consideration by the Conference of the Parties in the year thereafter;

³ Decision 3/CP.24, para. 7.

⁴ FCCC/CP/2019/INF.1.

⁵ FCCC/CP/2019/4.

⁶ FCCC/CP/2021/6.

⁷ FCCC/CP/2019/7.

⁸ See <https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf>.

21. *Invites* the Presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to organize the high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance in 2022 on the progress and fulfilment of the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020;
 22. *Reiterates* that the secretariat, in collaboration with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations agencies and bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels, will continue to explore ways and means to assist developing country Parties in assessing their needs and priorities in a country-driven manner, including their technological and capacity-building needs, and in translating climate finance needs into action;⁹
 23. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in paragraphs 20 and 22 above;
 24. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.
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⁹ Decision 6/CP.23, para. 10.